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I. INTRODUCTION
For as long as corporations have existed, debates have persisted among scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding how
best to describe their form and function as a positive matter, and
how best to organize relations among their various stakeholders
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as a normative matter.1 This is hardly surprising given the
economic and political stakes involved with control over vast and
growing “corporate” resources,2 and it has become commonplace
to speak of various approaches to corporate law in decidedly
political terms. In particular, on the fundamentally normative
issue of the aims to which corporate decision-making ought to be
directed, shareholder-centric conceptions of the corporation have
long been described as politically right-leaning while stakeholderoriented conceptions have conversely been described as politically
left-leaning.3 When the frame of reference for this normative
debate shifts away from state corporate law, however, a curious
reversal occurs. Notably, when the debate shifts to federal
political and judicial contexts, one often finds actors associated
with the political left championing expansion of shareholders’
corporate governance powers, and those associated with the
political right advancing more stakeholder-centric conceptions of
the corporation.4

1. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008) [hereinafter Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence].
2. See Christopher M. Bruner, The Corporation’s Intrinsic Attributes, in UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 60, 77–81 (Barnali
Choudhury & Martin Petrin eds., 2017).
3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 857–58 (1997)
(reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)) (describing “the
debate between conservative contractarianism and progressive communitarianism”).
4. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis
Financial Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 553–60 (2013) [hereinafter Bruner, Conceptions of
Corporate Purpose] (describing post-crisis federal corporate governance reforms, championed by the left, that favored shareholders); Richard Marens, Waiting for the North to Rise:
Revisiting Barber and Rifkin After a Generation of Union Financial Activism in the U.S., 52 J. BUS.
ETHICS 109, 113 (2004) (observing that some unions that had promoted takeover defenses
under state corporate law nevertheless supported shareholder resolutions through federal
securities regulation that “included reducing barriers to potential takeovers”); Brett H.
McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 778–80 (2015) (arguing
that, in its 2014 Hobby Lobby decision, the Supreme Court’s “conservative majority”
described the corporation in terms that “closely resemble the picture drawn by progressive
corporate law scholars”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?:
The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 335, 337–40 (2015) (arguing that, in its 2010 Citizens United decision, the Supreme
Court’s “five more conservative judges” premised their decision on “certain assumptions . . . about corporations and their investors [that] are inconsistent with conservative
corporate theory”).
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The aim of this article is to explain this disconnect and explore
its implications for the development of U.S. corporate governance,
with particular reference to the varied and evolving corporate
governance views of the political left—the side of the spectrum
where, I argue, the more dramatic and illuminating shifts have
occurred over recent decades and where the state/federal divide
is more difficult to explain. A widespread and fundamental
reorientation of the Democratic Party toward decidedly centrist
national politics fundamentally altered the role of corporate
governance and related issues in the project of assembling a
competitive coalition capable of appealing to working-class and
middle-class voters. Grappling with the legal, regulatory, and
institutional frameworks—as well as the economic and cultural
trends—that conditioned and incentivized this shift will prove
critical to understanding the state/federal divide regarding what
the “progressive” corporate governance agenda ought to be and
how the situation might change as the Democratic Party formulates responses to the November 2016 election.
I begin with a brief terminological discussion, examining how
various labels associated with the political left tend to be employed in relevant contexts (including “progressive,” communitarian,” “liberal,” and “center-left”), as well as varying ways of
defining the field of “corporate governance” itself. I then provide
an overview of “progressive” thinking about corporate governance in the context of state corporate law, contrasting those
views with the very different perspectives associated with centerleft political actors at the federal level.5
Based on this descriptive account, I then examine various
legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks, as well as important economic and cultural trends, that have played consequential
roles in prompting and/or exacerbating the state/federal divide.6
These include fundamental distinctions between state corporate
law and federal securities regulation; the differing postures of
lawmakers in Delaware (the legal home for most U.S. public

5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
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companies7) and Washington, D.C.; the rise of institutional investors; the evolution of organized labor interests; certain unintended
consequences of extra-corporate regulation (notably regarding
pension management); and the Democratic Party’s sharp rightward shift since the late 1980s. The article closes with a brief discussion of the prospects for state/federal convergence, concluding
that the U.S. corporate governance system (if one can properly use
the word here) will likely remain theoretically incoherent for the
foreseeable future due to the extraordinary range of relevant
actors and the fundamentally divergent forces at work in the very
different legal and political settings they inhabit.8
II. CENTER-LEFT POLITICS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As a threshold matter, a coherent discussion of “progressive”
conceptions of corporate governance in the context of state corporate law, and how they contrast with approaches to these issues
by actors associated with “center-left” politics at the national level,
requires some comment on how these (and related) terms tend to
be used. Accordingly, this Part begins with a brief terminological
discussion before providing an overview of prevalent left-leaning
approaches to these subjects in each setting.
A. A Comment on Terminology
Historically, the term “progressive” has been used in the
United States, with varying degrees of specificity, to refer to
various left-leaning political views. In the early decades of the
twentieth century the term was associated with “Progressivism,” a
political movement that opposed entrenched political power and
emphasized “a political community in which civically educated
citizens were not divided by enduring class, ethnic, or party
conflicts, but only by temporary, well-informed disagreements on
public issues.”9 Although “Progressives disagreed over issues like

7. See About the Division of Corporations, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware
.gov/aboutagency/ (last visited June 25, 2018).
8. See infra Parts IV–V.
9. Kenneth Finegold, Progressive Movement, US, in 2 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN POLITICS 236, 236 (David Coates ed., 2012).
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business regulation,”10 the movement broadly anticipated
stakeholder-oriented associations of the term “progressive” in the
emphasis placed upon protecting vulnerable individuals from “the
large institutions then forming in business and government.”11 In
this respect, the Progressive movement helped set the stage for
New Deal–era reforms, a major element of which involved fragmentation and regulation of concentrated economic and financial
power in an effort to “save farmers and workers from the onslaught of capital.”12
These broad social and political themes are reflected in contemporary corporate governance literature and discourse, where
the term “progressive” refers broadly to the view that corporate
law should exhibit direct and substantial regard for the interests
of various constituencies and public interests—notably labor and
the environment—and a correlative rejection of the notion that
maximizing return to shareholders ought to trump all other
interests.13 Along these lines, “progressive” corporate law scholars
have been described as “loosely bound both by their rejection of
the prevailing paradigm of the corporation as a public good
designed exclusively for the maximization of private profit” and
their embrace of “themes of efficiency and morality of responsibility, altruism, and unity within the corporate form as well as
between the corporation and the broader society.”14 A core expression of these commitments has involved widespread rejection
among progressive corporate law scholars of the atomistic and
market-based “contractarian” approach, which generally styles
the corporation as a “nexus” of binary contracts with various

10. Id. at 236–37.
11. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF

AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 30 (1994).
12. See id. at 34–42; see also Alan Brinkley, New Deal, in 2 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN POLITICS 152, 154 (David Coates ed., 2012) (observing the New Deal’s “mobilization and organization of new economic groups—most notably farmers and industrial
workers—who would henceforth play a major role in shaping public policy”).
13. See D. Gordon Smith, The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law 3, 7 (Univ. of Wisc.
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 1040, Mar. 2007), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=976742 (responding to “progressive” corporate scholar Kent Greenfield); see
also infra Section II.B.
14. PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (inside back
cover, “About the Book”).
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stakeholders who deserve no more or less than their contracts
specify.15 The progressive approach to corporate law, sometimes
labeled “communitarian,”16 has accordingly been associated with
public-oriented, left-leaning views, while the contractarian approach has conversely been associated with private-oriented,
right-leaning views.17
It is important to clarify, however, that we can, at most, speak
in terms of general tendencies in broadly associating such views
with the progressive left, and strict shareholder-centrism with the
right. It has been observed, for example, that “there is a surprising
degree of similarity between progressive communitarianism and
the philosophical underpinnings of modern social conservatism,”
and that “there is a particularly strong communitarian impulse
among religious conservatives, who place great importance upon
local communities.”18 For example, Lyman Johnson, a conservative

15. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 29–39 (2006); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract.
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 186–87, 196–98 (Lawrence E. Mitchell
ed., 1995).
16. See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 668 (2002) (describing “progressive corporate law, many of whose
proponents have characterized themselves, or are described by others, as communitarians”); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1039 (2013)
[hereinafter Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy] (“So-called corporate law progressives or
communitarians reject shareholder wealth maximization as a legal requirement and also on
normative grounds.”).
17. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 857–58 (describing “the debate between
conservative contractarianism and progressive communitarianism”); Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, Larry from the Left: An Appreciation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 121, 122 (2014)
(contrasting their left-leaning, “progressive” approach with Larry Ribstein’s “conservative
law-and-economics” approach); Kostant, supra note 16, at 674–75 (describing the shared
view “among progressives . . . that corporate law should treat public corporations as at
least quasi-public institutions that must be viewed holistically as more than the sum of
their privately ordered constituencies”); David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 7 (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Millon, Communitarianism] (observing contractarians’ adherence to “the familiar libertarian idea that consent should be the sole basis for obligation”
and that “[i]t is this libertarian premise that the corporate law communitarians reject”);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Preface, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW xiii, xiii–xiv (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995) (“Each of the scholars [contributing to Progressive Corporate Law] starts
from the premise that it is no longer reasonable . . . to treat the corporation as a purely
private mechanism . . . .”); Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 338–40 (describing commitment
to shareholder wealth maximization as “conservative” and the view that boards should
have latitude to consider “the . . . interests of all constituencies” as its “rival”).
18. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 883.
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communitarian, whose (positive and normative) rejection of
shareholder wealth maximization reflects deeply held religious
convictions,19 has productively co-authored on these topics for
decades with his decidedly left-leaning Washington and Lee colleague, David Millon.20 Johnson’s brand of conservatism contrasts
starkly with the fundamentally libertarian brand animating the
predominant and highly shareholder-centric contractarian conception of corporate law.21 Conversely, one might point to the Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, who selfidentifies as “an unabashed New Deal Democrat,” yet who appears to favor shareholder wealth maximization as a corporate
law rule (and believes as a positive matter that this represents
current law). As discussed below, Strine prefers to ameliorate the
excesses of shareholder wealth maximization through forms of
regulation external to corporate law22—policy preferences consistent with the predominant contractarian approach.23 Accordingly,
it is important to remain mindful of the fact that the association of
left-leaning politics with communitarianism, and the association
of right-leaning politics with shareholder-centrism, are not
19. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers in Educating (Christian)
Business Managers About Corporate Purpose 30 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1260979 (“Many calls
for socially responsible conduct, whether merely anti-contractarianism or more fully
rendered communitarian visions, lack a compelling moral framework. For religious believers, the notion of faithfulness provides a foundation for constructing, or at least a lens for
envisioning, a more ethical corporation.”).
20. See David Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections on a Scholarly
Career, 74 WASH . & LEE L. REV . 699, 705–06 (2017) (“My politics are pretty far to the left
and I have always voted as a Democrat. . . . Professor Johnson, in contrast, is a conservative, though not of the stripe that is ascendant today. Values like community,
stability, institutional self-reform, and regard for others animate his opposition to policies
that valorize shareholder wealth maximization and leave affected nonshareholders to fend
for themselves.”).
21. See, e.g., id. at 706 (“Professor Johnson’s religious commitment also led him to
reject arguments based solely on so-called free-market economics.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson,
Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 169 (1992)
(contrasting, in an analysis of Justice Lewis Powell’s opinions concerning state antitakeover laws, “an old-line conservatism . . . that manifests ‘a serious interest in institutions
like the family, church, the local community, the private sector for their value as buffering
or mediating forces and for their role in preserving a more diverse and pluralistic social
order’” with the “libertarian ‘free market’ brand that many corporate scholars . . . believed
robust takeover activity should both reflect and hasten along”).
22. See infra notes 269–70 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Section II.B.
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universals. As we will see, these counter-trends may prove helpful
in explaining certain dimensions of the state/federal divide with
which this article is concerned.24
In contrast with terms like “progressive” and “communitarian,” which bear the foregoing substantive policy connotations in
the corporate governance context, the term “center-left” gestures,
at a higher level of generalization, toward a relative position on
the left-right political spectrum. To be sure, all of these terms have
been loosely used to refer broadly to left-leaning views at a high
degree of generality.25 The term “center-left liberalism,” however,
is broadly associated in the economic sphere with commitment to
“the institutions of capitalism,” though tempered by “calls for
regulating those institutions in the interests of fairness, the
sustainability of the environment, and the growth and stability of
the economy itself”—the ultimate aim being “broadly shared
prosperity, raising up the middle class and the poor together.”26
Consistent with these broad tendencies, political parties
inhabiting the “center-left” neighborhood of the political spectrum
in Western countries have generally reflected “coalitions that
exclude the large party on the right,” while adhering to “nonradical, non-Marxist” policies and thereby excluding the extreme
left.27 Hallmarks of this centrist position have, in recent decades,
included continuing ties with organized labor, yet growing skepticism regarding “Keynesian fine-tuning” of the economy28—a
complex posture with important consequences for the Democratic
Party’s national political strategy and regulatory platform.29

24. See infra Part IV.
25. See, e.g., Paul Starr, Liberalism, Center-Left, in 2 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO

AMERICAN POLITICS 68, 69 (David Coates ed., 2012) (observing that the terms “progressive”
and “liberal” are “often used interchangeably” in political discourse regarding “the centerleft”); AL FROM, THE NEW DEMOCRATS AND THE RETURN TO POWER 113 (paperback ed. 2014)
(with Alice McKeon) (employing the terms “center-left” and “progressive” to describe the
Democratic Party’s rightward shift starting in the late 1980s).
26. Starr, supra note 25, at 68, 70, 73.
27. John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism:
Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Politics in Corporate Governance Reform, 34 POL. & SOC’Y
463, 493 n.1 (2006).
28. JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REFORM IN THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 35–36 (2010).
29. See infra Section III.F.
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Finally, and in light of the foregoing, it is important to
emphasize up front the relatively embracing nature of the term
“corporate governance.” Being the product of a much broader
range of legal, regulatory, and market structures than corporate
law alone, corporate governance reflects the combined impacts of
a much broader range of actors than are formally recognized
under corporate law. “Corporate law” may be accurately described as “the set of rules that defines the decision[-]making
structure of corporations,”30 a definition that (at least in the United
States) focuses exclusively on relationships among the board,
officers, and shareholders, to the exclusion of all others—including employees.31 By contrast, reference to “corporate governance”
connotes a much broader array of legal and market forces and
constraints, prompted by a much broader range of regulators,
market actors, and constituencies. Hence John Cioffi, in a comparative study, speaks of corporate governance as “constituted by
a juridical nexus of securities, company, and labor relations law
that structurally allocates power among managers, shareholders,
and employees within the corporation.”32 He adds that, as a
political matter, “these groups are the most important protagonists” and that conflicts among them will ultimately be “resolved
by state actors in widely varying ways that reflect the configuration of interests and allocation of power within the broader
political economy.”33 In the United States, this means that even
though corporate law may itself remain a product of state politics,
a given corporate governance issue may nevertheless be addressed through national politics, where very different power
30. Smith, supra note 13, at 4.
31. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH

HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell
eds., 2012) (observing the irony that employees are irrelevant to U.S. corporate law yet
central to the Coasian economic conception of the firm); see also Dalia Tsuk, Corporations
Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1897 (2003)
(describing reliance on collective bargaining agreements as the locus for addressing U.S.
workers’ interests); Andrew Pendleton & Howard Gospel, Corporate Governance and Labor,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 634, 637 (Mike Wright et al. eds.,
2013) (describing the U.S. and U.K. perspective that “the best way for labor to be involved
in governance was via a system of pluralism and opposition, based on trade unions and
collective bargaining”).
32. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 38.
33. Id.
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relations unfold in very different political fora,34 giving rise to
very different coalitional possibilities—which may well turn on
the interests and incentives of organized labor.35 This in turn
means that, notwithstanding the narrow focus of U.S. corporate
law, a full account of U.S. corporate governance requires grappling directly with labor’s interests and incentives—something of
a moving target over recent decades, due in part to the labor
force’s growing stake in corporate equities.36
B. The “Progressive” State Corporate Governance Agenda
With the foregoing terminological clarifications in mind, the
policy agendas that have come to be associated with “progressive”
corporate law at the state level, and “center-left” corporate
governance at the federal level, can be set out with greater specificity. A decidedly “progressive” corporate law agenda emerged in
the late 1980s and early 1990s as a response to what were regarded
as troubling developments in the market and in academia—the
advent of hostile takeovers, and the law and economics-inspired37
“nexus of contracts” theory of corporate law. A number of scholars
began insisting on a more relational conception of the corporation
and corporate law that has prompted a range of stakeholderoriented theoretical approaches. These theories differ in their
positive descriptions of corporate law, as well as their normative
34. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 11 (2009) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers].
35. See CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 31–32; Thibault Darcillon, Corporate Governance
Reforms and Political Partisanship: An Empirical Analysis, in 16 OECD Countries, 17 BUS. &
POL. 661, 662 (2015); Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31, at 634.
36. See, e.g., Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31, at 642–43, 650 (observing that employees may have various forms of direct or indirect involvement in corporate governance
via employee stock ownership plans and pensions); see also infra Sections III.D–E.
37. While clearly a reflection of the “law and economics” (L&E) movement, see
Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1397, one cannot assume that all L&E scholars fully accept the nexus theory’s claims. Indeed, some have rejected it outright as a descriptive theory. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 17, at 136 (citing Henry Hansmann
and Michael Klausner in this respect); Michael Klausner, The “Corporate Contract” Today 30
(Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 490, 2016), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2761463 (“The primary question is whether the contractarian theory is a valid
positive theory of corporate governance. The answer to that question is no.”). Others,
meanwhile, have rejected the nexus theory’s descriptive claims in the corporate context
while accepting them in noncorporate settings. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 17, at
128 (citing Larry Ribstein in this respect).
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prescriptions regarding how corporate governance ought to be
structured, but they share a common distaste for the nexus theory’s
claim that shareholder wealth maximization represents the sole
legitimate aim of corporate decision-making.
The nexus theory conceptualizes the corporation as a legal
nexus through which various stakeholders come together to
pursue corporate production, advancing the mixed positive and
normative claim that even if literal negotiation never occurs,
corporate law ought to, and generally does, approximate what the
relevant stakeholders would rationally have agreed to had they in
fact done so.38 Shareholders, on this account, are by default the
ultimate beneficiaries of board decision-making because rational
equity investors, knowing that they hold a residual claim (i.e., that
they receive a return on their investment only after fixed claimants are paid), would—in a hypothetical negotiation—demand the
right to elect the corporation’s directors and fiduciary duties
compelling those directors to focus on the shareholders’ interests.39 The interests of other stakeholders such as employees, and
“social” concerns such as environmental preservation, are by
contrast thought to be more efficiently dealt with by contract
and/or through extra-corporate regulation (that is, regulation
external to corporate law). Employees, on this account, are
assumed to be fully capable of bargaining for contractual protections in addition to those made generally available through labor
and employment law, while environmental harms are assumed to
be susceptible to containment through regulations, ensuring that
corporations absorb the cost of externalities (e.g., pollution) arising from the corporation’s pursuit of business.40
There is unquestionably considerable extra-corporate regulation that impacts employees’ relationships with corporate

38. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 14–15 (1991).
39. See id. at 36–39, 92–93.
40. See id. at 36–39. For additional discussion of the nexus conception of the
corporation, see CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW
WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 53–57 (2013) [hereinafter
BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD]; Bruner, Enduring
Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1397–401.
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employers41 and corporations’ incentives regarding environmental
harms.42 Progressive corporate scholars have, however, expressed
considerable skepticism regarding the notion that employees
could be expected to effectively negotiate and enforce sufficient
protections, and that environmental and other externalities can be
sufficiently contained through extra-corporate regulation. This has
led these scholars to conclude that the corporate governance system itself must permit some capacity to pursue aims not tethered
to shareholder wealth maximization.43 Labor vulnerabilities and
interests have loomed particularly large in this respect. Indeed, as
David Millon has observed, the “communitarian turn in corporate
law” that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s arose out of
“concern about the harm to nonshareholders that can occur as a
result of managerial adherence to the shareholder primacy
principle,” and particularly the “problem of nonshareholder vulnerability [that] emerged starkly during the hostile takeover
explosion of the 1980s.”44
In this light, it has been suggested with some justice that
progressive (or communitarian) corporate law scholars are above
all else “united by what they oppose,”45 and progressive scholars

41. See generally Bodie, supra note 31 (discussing the significance of the employeremployee relationship in agency law, intellectual property law, tax law, and of course
employment law).
42. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
43. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 14–19; David Millon, Communitarians,
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1381–86 (1993)
[hereinafter Millon, Communitarians]; see also Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and
Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. REV. 69, 70 (2015) [hereinafter, Bodie, Income Inequality]
(“[E]fforts to protect workers through labor and employment laws are insufficient to address the underlying power imbalances within the corporate structure.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and
Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 9–10 (2007) [hereinafter Strine, Toward Common Sense] (arguing that growing competition from countries
with lax labor and environmental regulation has heightened investors’ demand for “costcutting measures,” destabilizing the U.S. balance between corporate governance and extracorporate regulation).
44. Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 17, at 1–2; see also Deborah A. DeMott, Trust
and Tension Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1308, 1308–09 (1996) (reviewing
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)); Millon, Communitarians,
supra note 43, at 1373–76.
45. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 857; see also DeMott, supra note 44, at 1313 (“Disagreement with the contractual characterization is an explicit or implicit starting point for

278

01.BRUNER_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

267

9/7/18 10:01 AM

Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance

themselves have acknowledged the importance of developing a
positive alternative agenda defined by something more than
rejection of the nexus conception of the corporation and the
associated focus on shareholder wealth maximization.46 Coherent
theories with a progressive political orientation have, to be sure,
been articulated—most noteworthy among them being the “team
production” conception, styling the board as a “mediating
hierarch” charged with inducing all stakeholders to make firmspecific investments in the company, and accordingly remaining
beholden to none of them.47 Notwithstanding team production
theory’s clear rejection of shareholder wealth maximization as the
corporation’s singular purpose,48 however, it bears emphasizing
that team production is far from a fully developed “progressive”
theory. Indeed, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout style team
production theory as a variant of nexus theory that differs from
other such approaches, mainly in its rejection of the notion that

several of the contributions to Progressive Corporate Law.”); cf. Carl Landauer, Beyond the
Law and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an Era of Downsizing and Corporate
Engineering, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1694, 1701, 1708 (1996) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) and MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)) (critiquing
contributions to the Progressive Corporate Law volume for themselves being so heavily
infused and preoccupied with law-and-economics concepts).
46. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Sticking the Landing: Making the Most of the “Stakeholder
Moment,” 2015 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015) (“[T]hose academics advocating for the
downfall of the shareholder primacy model, this author included, have had difficulty fully
theorizing an alternative approach to corporate governance.”); Millon, Communitarians,
supra note 43, at 1387 (conceding, in 1993, that “[t]hose who say that communitarians have
not yet articulated a fully developed alternative agenda are correct”); David Millon,
Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 923 (2013) [hereinafter Millon,
Shareholder Social Responsibility] (similarly observing, in 2013, that “the stakeholder
approach to [corporate social responsibility] has value primarily because it rejects the
narrow notion of corporate purpose that would focus first and foremost on shareholder
wealth maximization”); see also J. William Callison, Seeking an Angle of Repose in U.S.
Business Organization Law: Fiduciary Duty Themes and Observations, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 441,
446–47 (2016) (“Although there have been attempts to develop a communitarian, sometimes termed ‘progressive,’ approach to business organization law, at this time, such an
approach has not been fully developed.”).
47. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 269–81 (1999). For additional discussion of the team production
conception of the corporation, see BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW
WORLD, supra note 40, at 57–60; Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1401–05.
48. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note
40, at 58; Kostant, supra note 16, at 672.
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shareholders represent the sole category of residual claimants,
prompting depiction of the corporation as a “nexus of firmspecific investments” by a broader array of critical stakeholders.49
While corporate law does, as a practical matter, give boards substantial latitude to attend to the interests of non-shareholders—a
straightforward consequence of the business judgment rule50—
and while such broad discretion is critical to the “mediating hierarch” conception of the board, team production theory, as such,
does not call for enhanced accountability to non-shareholders
along the lines often favored by progressive scholars.51
One way in which progressive corporate scholars clearly have
distinguished themselves from contractarians is in their insistent
focus on the political and distributive dimensions of corporate
law and corporate governance—and particularly their scrutiny
of the underlying social and economic conditions that render
market-based bargaining an insufficient means of protection.52
These competing visions reflect “strongly conflicting political
visions of the appropriate foundations of corporate law.”53
Whereas “the communitarian project openly addresses political
questions and demands judgments that contractarians often seem
to believe . . . to be avoidable,” contractarians by and large “simply do not bother to speak about it in those terms.”54 Indeed, “the
scientific pretensions of the ‘law and economics’ movement” have

49. See Blair & Stout, supra note 47, at 253–54, 262–65, 275, 285, 314 n.178, 319–20.
50. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note

40, at 58; Blair & Stout, supra note 47, at 299–309; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits
in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
51. See Blair & Stout, supra note 47, at 254, 319–28; see also David Millon, New Game
Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1001, 1022 (2000) (observing of team production theory that the absence of any
stakeholder-oriented mandate permits boards so minded “to pursue shareholder value
with relentless disregard for social costs”); infra note 63 (discussing predominant progressive reform proposals).
52. See Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 17, at 7–9. As Stephen Bainbridge has
observed, “there is a surprising degree of similarity between progressive communitarianism and the philosophical underpinnings of modern social conservatism”—notably the
“great importance [placed] upon local communities and other mediating institutions.” The
two camps disagree fundamentally, however, as Bainbridge observes, regarding “the
proper role of the state.” Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 883–85; see also id. at 885–90 (exploring
what he terms the “essentially statist nature of the progressive agenda”).
53. Millon, Communitarians, supra note 43, at 1377.
54. Id. at 1387.
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encouraged a tendency among scholars in this tradition to
presume that corporate law in the United States and elsewhere
will ultimately converge on consistent and (presumptively) optimal regulatory responses to broadly similar corporate governance
challenges, as if by a sort of apolitical natural law.55
To be sure, progressive scholars have differed markedly in
their descriptive accounts of how contemporary corporate law
addresses these fundamental matters—particularly with respect to
Delaware, the predominant jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S.
public companies.56 While states that have adopted so-called
“constituency statutes,” giving boards of directors broad latitude
to take account of non-shareholder interests in corporate decisionmaking, would appear straightforwardly to have adopted a more
progressive conception of corporate purpose,57 Delaware has not
adopted such a statute,58 fueling some controversy regarding
where Delaware falls on this theoretical and political continuum.
The Delaware statute provides no clear definition of corporate
purpose, and likewise provides no clear answers regarding who
prevails in predictable collisions of board and shareholder governance powers, leaving these matters to Delaware’s courts—a
pattern discernible both in the hostile takeover battles of the 1980s
and 1990s, as well as the shareholder bylaw battles raising
fundamentally similar issues today.59 Some progressive corporate

55. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40,
at 6, 112–15 (describing these tendencies in the comparative corporate governance context).
56. See supra note 7.
57. See McDonnell, supra note 4, at 794 (“[O]ver half of the states have adopted a
corporate constituency statute, which explicitly allows directors to consider the interests of
enumerated stakeholders. Although a cramped reading of these statutes is conceivable, it
seems pretty clear that in these states the stakeholder conception has triumphed.”); see also
BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40, at 44.
58. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 762, 780–81 (2015) [hereinafter Strine, The Dangers of Denial].
59. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note
40, at 42–52, 172–73; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(a)(3) (providing that it suffices for
the charter to state that “the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or
activity”), 109(b), 141(a) (giving shareholders unilateral authority to enact bylaws
regarding the “rights or powers” of shareholders and directors, yet giving boards of
directors plenary authority to manage the “business and affairs” of the corporation, with
no reconciling principle), 203 (imposing modest limits on “[b]usiness combinations with
interested stockholders,” but providing no general guidance regarding takeovers) (2018). In
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scholars, as well as jurists who self-identify as leaning toward the
political left, have concluded that Delaware embraces shareholder
wealth maximization as the corporation’s defining aim, through
preferential treatment afforded shareholders under the statute
(e.g., the power to elect directors), as a beneficiary of direct fiduciary duties, and through the courts’ requirement that stock price
be maximized in a sale or break-up of the company.60 Others,
myself included, have emphasized that Delaware case law
permits substantial management discretion to show regard for
non-shareholder interests, that shareholder wealth maximization
remains unenforceable beyond a narrow range of final-period
scenarios (that arise only when the board so decides), and that the
governance powers afforded to shareholders under the Delaware
statute are remarkably weak in comparison with those afforded
to their counterparts in other common-law jurisdictions.61 I have
described these realities elsewhere as expressions of
fundamental “ambivalence” regarding “the locus of ultimate

just a handful of areas, the Delaware legislature has clarified the appropriate reach of
shareholder-enacted bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112 (permitting bylaws enabling
shareholders to advance their own board nominees through the company’s proxy
statement), 115 (prohibiting bylaws that “prohibit bringing [internal corporate] claims in
the courts of this State”), 216 (insulating from board amendment or repeal a “bylaw
amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for
the election of directors”) (2016).
60. See generally, e.g., Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58 (expressing
sympathy toward “center-left” views while arguing that “stockholder welfare [is] the sole
end of corporate governance” under Delaware law); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate
Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181 (2014) (identifying with “progressive” scholars
normatively while arguing that Delaware law embraces “shareholder primacy”); see also
GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 22 (arguing that those describing corporate law as embracing
“shareholder supremacy” are, in terms of “pure description, . . . more right than wrong”);
Greenfield, supra note 46, at 147–48 (reporting “significant pushback against the
shareholder primacy norm” while arguing that “accounts of [its] imminent death . . .
are exaggerated”).
61. See, e.g., BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra
note 40, at 36–65; LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 24–32 (2012); Bruner,
Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1408–27; Elhauge, supra note 50; Kostant, supra note
16, at 683; Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 898–903, 909–17 (1990); Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy,
supra note 16, at 1014, 1022–25, 1043–44. Tellingly, those who locate strong-form commitment to shareholder wealth maximization in Delaware law acknowledge that such a rule
(assuming it exists) is effectively unenforceable, and that the handful of judicial expressions
of commitment to such a conception of corporate purpose cite no authority. See Strine, The
Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 772–77; Yosifon, supra note 60, at 190–94, 223–24.
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corporate governance authority, the intended beneficiaries of
corporate production, and the relationship between corporate law
and the achievement of the social good.”62
The critical point for present purposes, however, is simply the
broadly shared normative commitment among self-identified
“progressives” to the notion that the interests of non-shareholders,
and issues not tethered to maximizing shareholder return, should
be regarded as legitimate ends of corporate decision-making.63
This, as the following section explores, sharply distinguishes the
posture of progressive corporate scholars focusing on state-level
corporate law from the posture of actors associated with the
“center-left” at the federal level, whom one might have expected
to represent the progressive corporate scholars’ natural allies.

62. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40,
at 37; Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1386. Though not couched in political
terms, others have developed the intriguing argument that corporate law must maintain
some degree of ambiguity regarding corporate purpose in order for a singular duty of
loyalty to apply to heterogeneous directors. See generally Martin Gelter & Genviève Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1069 (2015); see also OptimisCorp v. Waite, No. 523, 2015, 2016 WL 2585871, *1, *3 (Del.
Apr. 25, 2016) (Strine, C.J.) (expressing commitment to collaborative decision-making by
the entire board and correlative skepticism regarding “board factions”).
63. See Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 16, at 1013; see also Yosifon,
supra note 60, at 184 (arguing that “shareholder primacy is indeed the law,” while
advocating “broader responsibilities on corporate boards”). As Kent Greenfield observes,
the policy positions “most routinely discussed by ‘progressive’ corporate law scholars”
include “relaxing the profit maximization norm, extending management’s fiduciary duty to
include workers, and requiring some kind of worker representation on boards of directors.” GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 154; see also Bodie, Income Inequality, supra note 43, at
84–89 (advocating employee involvement in corporate governance); Greenfield, supra note
46, at 150–60 (advocating stakeholder-oriented fiduciary duties, stakeholder board
representation, and greater board diversity); Marleen A. O’Connor, Promoting Economic
Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit
Employment Agreements, in P ROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 219, 228–30 (Lawrence E. Mitchell
ed., 1995) (arguing that fiduciary duties should be owed to both shareholders and
employees); cf. Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 767–68, 786–93 (arguing that if
non-shareholders are to be protected within corporate law they should be given
“enforceable rights,” but that strong “externality regulation” would be preferable). It must
be acknowledged, however, that progressive scholars are hardly unanimous regarding the
viability of such reforms. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 17, at 11–22
(arguing that “the multifiduciary approach” remains “vague,” while implicit contract
theory remains similarly “indeterminate” and susceptible to disclaimer); see also DeMott,
supra note 44, at 1322–25 (agreeing with Millon).
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C. The “Center-Left” Federal Corporate Governance Agenda
In stark contrast with the stakeholder-oriented agenda associated with “progressives” at the level of state corporate law,
various political groups, who one might have assumed would
share their views, have in fact pursued agendas at the federal level
that flatly contradict the views described above.64 The Democratic
Party and important constituencies thereof—notably, organized
labor—have strongly favored corporate governance reforms premised on views that corporate law progressives categorically reject, including the notion that shareholder wealth maximization
represents the defining aim of the corporation and the appropriate
metric for director and officer decision-making.
Traditionally, the process of incorporation and the development of corporate law governing relations among a corporation’s
directors, officers, and shareholders has been left to the states
under an unusual choice-of-law rule called the “internal affairs
doctrine.”65 It is critical to recognize, however, that Congress
retains unquestioned plenary power to federalize corporate law
as, and when, it likes under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.66 While efforts to federalize corporate law outright
arose at various points in the twentieth century, those initiatives
were not successful.67 Federal corporate governance initiatives
enacted over the last several decades have tended to be sporadic
and crisis-driven—a pattern reflected in the creation of federal
securities regulation and the Securities and Exchange Commission
64. Cf. Greenfield, supra note 46, at 147–49 (describing the “tension” between progressives “who seek to emphasize ‘shareholder activism’ to further progressive ends and
those who want to defeat shareholder primacy by a greater emphasis on managerial discretion and autonomy”).
65. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 302(2), 304 (1971).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress authority to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); see also
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive
Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1084 (2008) (“No substantial
argument can be made that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to enact a
preemptive corporate law governing publicly traded corporations operating in interstate commerce.”).
67. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 597 (2003) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware’s Competition].
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(SEC) in the early 1930s following the stock market crash and
ensuing “Great Depression,” and then more recently in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act following the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies, and the Dodd-Frank Act following the financial crisis.68
Critically, for present purposes, each of these reform initiatives
was championed by Democrats.
The creation of federal securities regulation was, the SEC
explains, “designed to restore investor confidence in [U.S.] capital
markets by providing investors and the markets with more
reliable information and clear rules of honest dealing.”69 In this
light, it is hardly surprising that the SEC’s institutional disposition
would be to maintain a heavy focus on capital providers; the
SEC’s mission is, in the Commission’s words, “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.”70 The federal securities regime, and the SEC
itself, represent one of numerous federal reforms enacted under
the administration of Democratic President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, who appointed Joseph Kennedy—father of a later
68. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J.
CORP. L. 309, 332–35 (2011) [hereinafter Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis];
Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder
Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 26–29 (2011) [hereinafter Bruner, Managing Corporate
Federalism]; Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 34, at 7–12; Roe,
Delaware’s Competition, supra note 67, at 591–93. This is not to suggest, however, that securities
reforms occur exclusively in response to crises. See generally Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and
Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435 (2017) (arguing that the crisis-based
account of securities reform is incomplete, and that private industry favors prescriptive
legislation minimizing agency interference in non-crisis contexts to directly operationalize
their deregulatory preferences, yet favors delegation to agencies following crises to maximize opportunities to prevent restrictive regulation from materializing).
69. What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec
.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013); see also Bruner, Managing
Corporate Federalism, supra note 68, at 43 (observing that, with respect to corporate
governance debates, “the SEC is effectively a single-constituency regulator”); Cioffi &
Höpner, supra note 27, at 484 (observing “the Democrats’ historical support for the
regulatory state,” evidenced by the fact that “the New Deal of the 1930s created modern
securities regulation”). To observe that the SEC’s mission is “to protect investors” is not,
however, to say that the SEC invariably achieves this aim. See, e.g., Renae Merle, Despite
Travails, White Calls SEC ‘Aggressive and Successful,” WASH. P OST (May 27, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/05/27/despite-travails
-white-calls-sec-aggressive-and-successful/?utm_term=.b56a45faa8c5 (reporting “complaints”
about the SEC, including that “the agency has not been tough enough on Wall Street” and
has historically been “a slow and toothless tiger”).
70. What We Do, supra note 69.
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Democratic President, John F. Kennedy—to serve as the SEC’s
first chairman.71
Over recent decades, the gulf between the SEC’s shareholdercentric focus and greater regard for other stakeholders under
state-level corporate law has come fully into focus. As of the early
1990s, state takeover law increasingly suggested that “the
appropriate balance among shareholder and nonshareholder
interests . . . can no longer be resolved by a facile bow in the
direction of shareholder primacy,” yet at the same time, the SEC,
“pursuing its usual single constituency agenda, . . . revised its
proxy rules to encourage institutional shareholder activism . . . .”72
While Republicans did achieve limited victories during the years
of the Clinton administration in passing “securities litigation
reform legislation designed to reduce the incidence of securities
litigation”73—including “the only successful override of a
presidential veto during Clinton’s two terms in office”74—the
trend in federal policymaking during the Clinton years strongly
favored shareholders.
Since the turn of the millennium, shareholder-centric corporate governance reforms at the federal level have picked up pace,
and such reforms have uniformly emerged from the political left.75
The collapse of Enron and other finance-driven corporate scandals
created a real crisis of public confidence in capital markets,
prompting greater federal willingness to intervene in public
company corporate governance76 and permitting “reformers to

71. Id.
72. Millon, Communitarians, supra note 43, at 1376; see also Cioffi & Höpner, supra

note 27, at 481–82.
73. Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 481.
74. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 105–07 (describing enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995); see also H.R. 1058 (104th): Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/104-1995/h839 (last
visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the House votes); H.R. 1058 (104th): Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr1058
(last visited June 25, 2018) (“This bill was enacted after a congressional override of the
President’s veto on December 22, 1995.”).
75. See Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 482–83; Martin Gelter, The Pension System
and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 949–50 (2013) [hereinafter
Gelter, The Pension System]; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528, 1549–51, 1556 (2005).
76. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 110–11.
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break through the bottlenecks and veto points of politics” for a
certain window of time.77 As Cioffi observes of this period, one
finds “for the first time . . . the interests and perceptions of the
investor class [being] viewed, however questionably, as largely
coterminous with those of the citizenry at large,” with consequent
heavy political emphasis on the “rhetoric of shareholder value.”78
Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 indeed
“represented a break with established forms of regulation and
federalism in American corporate governance,” marking a shift
from historically disclosure-based federal securities reforms
toward “expanded federal regulatory authority over corporate
accounting” and more direct regulation of the structure of the
board of directors itself.79 Reforms included, among other things,
a requirement that the accounting firm for a public company
report directly to an “audit committee” consisting entirely of
independent directors80—a shift toward federally mandated
independence strongly reinforced by a New York Stock Exchange
requirement that “[l]isted companies must have a majority of
independent directors.”81 While votes on SOX’s enactment in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate were virtually
unanimous,82 it is well understood that SOX “was the product of a
political struggle between Democrats using financial scandals
against the Republicans and Republicans seeking to delay or
dilute the legislation in keeping with their loyalty to corporate
supporters and their antiregulation ideological policy agenda.”83
As Cioffi observes, Republicans ultimately “sought to neutralize
the scandals as a potent November 2002 election issue by

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 110–16.
See id. at 97–99, 117, 119–20.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. §§ 204, 301 (2002).
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (last amended
Nov. 25, 2009).
82. See H.R. 3763 (107th): Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, GOVTRACK, https://www.gov
track.us/congress/votes/107-2002/h348 (last visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the House
votes); H.R. 3763 (107th): Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/votes/107-2002/s192 (last visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the Senate votes).
83. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 111–12.

287

01.BRUNER_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/7/18 10:01 AM

2018

supporting corporate governance reform and accepting only
minor compromises from the Democrats.”84
Following the financial crisis that emerged in 2007, Democrats
sought numerous shareholder-focused federal reforms, achieving
a number of them. Firms subject to the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) faced not only pay restrictions and oversight by
the Department of Treasury, but also “say-on-pay” votes giving
shareholders an advisory vote on executive compensation.85 More
ambitiously, Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York
introduced a bill in May 2009 that aimed to “provide shareholders
with enhanced authority over the nomination, election, and
compensation of public company executives”—a raft of proposed
reforms styled as a “Shareholder Bill of Rights.”86 Had it been
enacted, Schumer’s Shareholder Bill of Rights Act would have
brought with it a number of reforms strongly enhancing the
corporate governance position of shareholders, including clear
authority for the SEC to give shareholders greater access to the
company’s proxy statement in order to nominate directors (an
initiative typically referred to as “proxy access”), shareholder sayon-pay and golden parachute votes, and exchange listing rules
requiring independent board chairs and annual elections of
directors by majority vote (differing markedly from the default
plurality voting system).87 While the Shareholder Bill of Rights
Act was not ultimately enacted, the Dodd-Frank Act, signed into
law by President Barack Obama in July 2010, did include certain
of these reforms. Dodd-Frank reforms favoring shareholders
included say-on-pay and golden parachute votes, disclosure requirements focusing on how executive compensation relates to the
corporation’s performance, a three-year clawback mechanism for
incentive-based compensation following accounting restatements,
and clear authority for the SEC to provide enhanced proxy

84. Id. at 116; see also Romano, supra note 75, at 1564–65.
85. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. § 7001

(2009); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §§ 111,
302 (2008).
86. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. pmbl., § 1 (2009).
87. Id. §§ 3–5.
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access.88 Additional Dodd-Frank reforms affecting corporate
governance included a requirement that certain larger financial
firms have risk committees89 and additional regulation for
incentive-based pay in certain financial firms that regulators
conclude “could lead to material financial loss to the covered
financial institution.”90 The Dodd-Frank Act itself was enacted
following clear party-line votes, with almost no Republicans
voting in favor.91
Post-crisis reform efforts of this sort, strongly redounding to
the benefit of shareholders, were sought by union pensions
(among others)92—retirement funds associated with the principal
purported beneficiaries of stakeholder-oriented “progressive”
initiatives at the state level—and as noted, the reforms described
above were enacted at the behest of Democrats. That shareholdercentric corporate governance reforms would have been adopted in
response to a crisis thought to have resulted from excessive risktaking is puzzling enough, given the well-understood preference
of equity investors for greater risk-taking and the empirical
literature’s association of shareholder-centric governance with
poor performance in the run-up to the crisis.93 That such reforms

88. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. §§ 951, 953, 954, 971 (2010).
89. Id. § 165(h).
90. Id. § 956(a)(1)(B). For additional background on these reform efforts, including
challenges faced by regulators in operationalizing proxy access and regulation of incentivebased pay in financial firms, see BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW
WORLD, supra note 40, at 268–72; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal
Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783, 1796–1812 (2011) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank].
91. See H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2010/h413 (last visited June 25,
2018) (tabulating the House votes); H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2010
/s208 (last visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the Senate votes).
92. See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Inv’rs,
and others, to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House 1–2 (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.ott.ct.gov/pressreleases/press2008/PR12022008.pdf.
93. For an overview of this literature and corporate governance reform proposals
responding to it, see BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD,
supra note 40, at 262–65; see also CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 206-08; Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank,
supra note 90, at 1818–19; Adam Zurofsky, Corporations: The “Positive Discipline” Model,
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS (2016), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/41/corporations-the
-positive-discipline-model/.
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would be championed by the political left, however, in stark
contrast with stakeholder-oriented “progressive” initiatives in
state-level corporate law, is doubly surprising. Part III explores
potential explanations for this extraordinary state/federal divide
among the political left.
III. EXPLAINING THE STATE/FEDERAL DIVIDE
The disjuncture between the corporate governance policy
preferences of the political left at the state and federal levels is
complex indeed, though measured by reference to traditional
political affiliations, it is the left’s preferences at the federal level
that are more difficult to explain. As John Cioffi and Martin
Höpner observe, one might reasonably expect that “the center-left
should oppose, rather than support, corporate governance
reform” that favors shareholders because the political economy
literature “tend[s] to identify the center-left and organized labor
as . . . hostile to shareholder interests.”94
Undoubtedly these phenomena reflect the interaction of
numerous political factors, and this Part canvasses a range of
potential explanatory variables, some of which have received
substantial attention in the U.S. corporate governance literature
while others have received less attention. Ultimately, I acknowledge that accounts emphasizing institutional and political
distinctions between state and federal politics and regulatory
regimes point us in the right direction, though such distinctions
do not always in fact break the way that prior literature predicts.
It has been suggested that constituencies such as organized labor
have a greater voice at the federal level, though in reality such
actors have demonstrably impacted corporate governance politics
at the state level as well. More telling is the fact that these actors
have themselves pursued very different courses at state and
federal levels, often in response to legal and regulatory structures
not traditionally regarded as central to “corporate governance.”
This Part of the Article argues that the diametrically opposed
normative agendas pursued by left-leaning actors at state and
federal levels reflect the extraordinary legal, institutional, and
94. Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 464.
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political complexities of corporate governance in the United States.
While I acknowledge the significance of familiar distinctions
between state corporate law and federal securities law as forms of
regulation, and between Delaware and Washington, D.C., as sites
of rulemaking, I argue that this normative divide among the left
more proximately reflects structural changes in capital markets
and the labor movement that have reinforced a fundamental
reorientation of the Democratic Party since the mid-1980s toward
decidedly centrist national politics.
Several trends have prompted a center-left politics of corporate governance at the federal level bearing no relation whatsoever to the progressive agenda for corporate law at the state
level, including a reorientation of labor unions away from traditional organizing activities and toward pension management, as
active union membership dwindles relative to the population of
aging pensioners; an intense focus of applicable labor regulation
on generating returns for pensioners, including fiduciary obligations interpreted to require pensions to engage in activism aimed
at forcing corporate managers to focus intently on maximizing
returns to shareholders; and the increasingly centrist Democratic
Party’s efforts to capitalize on these pro-shareholder trends by
assembling an anti-manager “middle class” coalition of workers
and financial institutions. These trends have fundamentally altered the role of corporate governance and related issues in the
project of assembling a competitive electoral coalition. The legal,
economic, and cultural trends that conditioned and incentivized
this shift are critical to understanding the state/federal divide
regarding what the “progressive” corporate governance agenda
ought to be.
A. Corporate v. Securities Law
As noted above, corporate law (including in Delaware)
arguably remains ambivalent regarding the degree to which
corporate governance ought to empower shareholders and focus
narrowly on their interests,95 whereas securities regulation,
essentially by design, reflects no such ambivalence when it comes
95. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
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to corporate governance—the clear aim of the regulatory regime
and the SEC being investor protection.96 While it is undoubtedly
true that this mission renders securities regulation’s purview
broader in some respects than that of corporate law—
bondholders, for example, having standing to sue under the
former regime but not the latter97—it nevertheless remains the
case that in corporate governance debates the SEC has strongly
favored shareholders’ interests.
It has been argued with some force that there is a fundamental
complementarity between securities regulation and corporate
law—the relatively homogenous interests of investors when
making trades prompting undifferentiated, disclosure-based
securities regulation, whereas the more heterogeneous interests of
investors holding stock prompt “greater flexibility and diversity”
in corporate law.98 This notion of regulatory complementarity
presumes that securities regulation remains a predominantly
disclosure-based field. Yet, as we have already seen, there is
substantial and increasing overlap between the two fields as the
securities regime has, over recent decades, increasingly focused
attention on core aspects of corporate governance traditionally left
to the states.99 In addition to proxy voting—enabled by state
corporate law, yet long regulated substantially at the federal level
for public companies100—core elements of public company board
structure and operations have, since the turn of the millennium,
come to be governed by securities regulation and associated stock
exchange rules requiring (among other things) a majority independent board and fully independent audit and compensation

96. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
97. See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law,

64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 154–55 (2017).
98. Id. at 121–22.
99. Park acknowledges this, framing his argument conceptually as a means of
discerning what the line between these fields ought to be. See id. at 129–30, 157–58, 163–82;
see also Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90, at 1796–812.
100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2012) (authorizing voting by proxy in Delaware corporations); 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (granting the SEC authority to enact rules
regulating the solicitation of proxies for securities issued by companies registered under
§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1–240.14b-2 (2017) (Regulation 14a, including SEC-enacted rules governing proxy solicitation).
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committees.101 As the securities regime looms larger in corporate
governance, so too does its primary constituency—shareholders.
These dynamics are certainly relevant to explaining the
state/federal divide with respect to degrees of shareholdercentrism in these two fields. Such dynamics do not, however, shed
light in any clear way on the specific question that this article
addresses—the divide between left-leaning voices at state and
federal levels with respect to fundamental corporate governance
policy preferences. As noted above, straightforward party affiliations would lead one to expect the left to adopt positions at the
federal level resembling those we have encountered in “progressive” accounts of corporate law at the state level,102 yet we
find exactly the opposite. This political divide requires a more
complete explanation.
B. Delaware v. Washington, D.C.
As opposed to focusing on the nature of state and federal legal
regimes themselves, some accounts focus on the institutional
settings in which they are produced. Notably, Mark Roe has explored at length the competitive dynamics between Delaware, the
principal site for production of U.S. corporate law as a matter of
custom and market practice, and Washington, D.C., the locus of
ultimate constitutional competence in the field. Observing that no
other states meaningfully compete with Delaware for cross-border
incorporations,103 Roe has forcefully argued that Washington,
D.C.—per the Commerce Clause—represents Delaware’s true
competition in the production of corporate law.104
Critically for the present inquiry, D.C. represents a very
different institutional setting, bringing different inputs to bear
101. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 952 (2010) (requiring a fully independent compensation committee);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 301 (2002) (requiring a fully independent audit committee); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note
81, § 303A.01 (last amended Nov. 25, 2009) (requiring a majority independent board).
102. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
103. See Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 34, at 5–6; see
also Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism, supra note 68, at 27–28.
104. See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 67, at 591–93, 596–97, 600–06, 632–33;
see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) [hereinafter Roe,
Delaware’s Politics].
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upon the policymaking process. In his account of Delaware’s
corporate lawmaking position, Roe observes that, whereas the
“general polity is not usually involved directly in Delaware, even
though the corporation affects parties beyond managers and
investors,” in D.C. “the range of interests with the clout to
influence policy widens beyond just investors and managers”—
for example, labor and “public interest lobbying groups.”105
Instances in which the federal corporate governance machinery
has been operationalized have tended to be “sudden, episodic,
and crisis-driven,”106 with reform efforts responding to public
attention and “populist anger.”107 Roe identifies various circumstances in which Delaware is more likely to be overcome by D.C.,
observing that “Congress sets aside Delaware-based, quasiprivate lawmaking when the media reveals gross corporate
wrongdoing or when poor national economic performance is
plausibly tied to corporate governance.”108
Roe’s account is a conceptually rich one, identifying important
federal institutional features that undoubtedly affect how and
when Delaware can act on its own. Distinctions regarding which
actors tend to be operative at each level of government do not,
however, resolve the question addressed here, because we have
an identifiable political left at both state and federal levels who do
not behave consistently—including particular sets of actors who
have, themselves, taken inconsistent positions in the two settings.
For example, as discussed further below, organized labor supported the enactment of so-called “constituency” statutes in response
to hostile takeovers109 yet has also supported shareholder-centric
105. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 104, at 2499–504; see also Bainbridge, DoddFrank, supra note 90, at 1784–85.
106. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 137.
107. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90, at 1786–87; see also Bruner, Conceptions of
Corporate Purpose, supra note 4, at 553–60.
108. See Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 104, at 2529; see also Bainbridge, DoddFrank, supra note 90, at 1815–19 (advancing a similar critique of Dodd-Frank reforms);
Romano, supra note 75, at 1525–29, 1563, 1566 (arguing that a crisis context facilitated
adoption of SOX reforms, unrelated to Enron’s problems, that “policy entrepreneurs”
sought for other reasons).
109. See Mark J. Roe, Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 79, 83 (Mike Wright et al. eds.,
2013) (observing that the AFL-CIO supported adoption of Pennsylvania’s anti-takeover
law); cf. Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
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corporate governance reform efforts at the federal level—
including initiatives aimed at reducing barriers to hostile takeovers.110 Accordingly, a full explanation of the divide regarding
corporate governance among left-leaning actors at state and federal levels will require some account of the perceived interests of
labor, in particular, as they are formulated in different settings
and at different times.
C. The Rise of Institutions
In addition to substantive dimensions of the relevant legal
fields and institutional dimensions of the relevant state and
federal regulatory fora, important market developments have
affected the manner in which various actors conceptualize and
pursue their interests. Among such market developments, the rise
of institutional investors has substantially impacted the salience of
shareholder interests in political and market discourse.
For decades, it has been commonplace to describe the U.S.
public company as reflecting a “separation of ownership and
control,” with widely dispersed minority stockholders remaining
entirely passive, and accordingly permitting corporate power to
default entirely to the board of directors and appointed officers.111
At least from the 1930s, large corporations “were seen as autonomous entities governed by a professional, managerial class[,]”
and “progressive” scholars placed great emphasis on their
capacities to satisfice various constituencies.112 Peter Gourevitch
and James Shinn describe these middle decades of the twentieth
century as reflecting “an American version of the corporatist
compromise.” During this period, corporate governance “was part
35, 52 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 34, at 25–26.
110. See infra Sections III.D–E.
111. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 5–7 (Transaction Publishers 2010) (1932).
112. Tsuk, supra note 31, at 1899–900, 1903–04. Nobel Prize–winning economist
Herbert Simon coined the term “satisficing” to describe pursuit of what is “good enough,”
in contrast with seeking to maximize. As applied to organizational managers, Simon wrote
that “Whereas economic man maximizes, selects the best alternative from among all those
available to him, . . . his cousin, administrative man, satisfices, looks for a course of action
that is satisfactory or ‘good enough’.” See Herbert Simon, ECONOMIST (Mar. 20, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/13350892 (quoting Simon).
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and parcel” of the post–New Deal economic and regulatory
environment and was largely “produced by the coalition that
supported it: farmers and landowners, labor, industries of many
kinds seeking help, thus another burst of populism mixed with
owner interests that wanted a regulated economy.”113 By the
1970s, however, the market began to shift in favor of large, and
increasingly assertive, institutional investors.114 Today they are
decidedly “the dominant players” in capital markets, with institutions, including pensions, investment companies (e.g., mutual
funds), insurers, university endowments, and bank trust departments collectively holding “approximately three-fourths of the
1,000 largest U.S. corporations and around 70% of the shares of all
U.S. corporations.”115 Such institutions have substantially reconcentrated the otherwise dispersed shareholdings that typified
public company stock ownership through much of the twentieth
century. Accordingly, shareholders in this institutional form no
longer remain passive bystanders—a market reality fostering the
emergence of effective advocates for the enhancement of shareholder-centrism, bringing extraordinary market power to bear
upon corporate governance.116
This greater capacity for, and predilection toward, activism
has included reinvigorated use of shareholders’ voting power,
both directly and through proxy advisors. It is critical to observe,
however, that this re-concentration of voting power has effectively
empowered professional managers, not the actual beneficial
investors in their funds, creating what now–Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court Leo Strine has called a “separation of
ownership from ownership.”117 This is potentially problematic
because the underlying beneficial investors often save for longterm goals, such as retirement or the education of their children,

113. PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, P OLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE
CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 245–46 (2005).
114. See Tsuk, supra note 31, at 1899–900, 1903–04.
115. Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 913 (footnote omitted).
116. See Tsuk, supra note 31, at 1903–09.
117. Strine, Toward Common Sense, supra note 43, at 15.
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yet the institutions hired to help them achieve these goals often
face “pressure to generate short-term results.”118
The market pressures resulting from institutions’ short-term
time horizon, and greater capacity to enforce more shareholdercentric corporate management, have led David Millon to distinguish between the “traditional” shareholder primacy model,
preserving a high degree of board discretion to focus on the longterm and to temper profit maximization, and a new “radical”
shareholder primacy model focusing primarily on quarterly
earnings and styling the board as a mere agent of the shareholders
(economically, if not legally)—a model drawing power from
Chicago-school law and economics scholarship.119 While there
may be “no legal authority for the radical shareholder primacy”
model, it most assuredly reflects a powerful phenomenon of
market culture, and understanding its roots in market and legal
pressures exerted upon the institutions themselves is critical to
developing a full account of the role of shareholders in modern
corporate governance.120 It is also critical to understanding why
left-leaning actors, including labor unions, have sought very
different things in state and federal settings—a complex matter
addressed in the remainder of Part III of the Article.
D. The Evolution of Organized Labor Interests
The power base, the interests, and even the identity of organized labor in the United States have evolved substantially over
recent decades, and understanding why actors associated with
organized labor have increasingly supported—and indeed vocally
advocated—shareholder-centric federal corporate governance reforms requires an account of these changes. As this section

118. See id. at 10. Strine’s account is broadly consistent with the “financialization”
literature, which has explored “the intensification of pressures on managers to prioritize
what are ostensibly ‘owner’ interests in the light of changes in investor composition and
behavior,” while emphasizing that “financial intermediaries” themselves have increasingly
marginalized both corporate managers and the “ordinary investors” who the institutions
ostensibly represent. See Geoffrey Wood & Mike Wright, An Age of Corporate Governance
Failure? Financialization and Its Limits, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 703, 703 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013).
119. See generally Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 16.
120. Id. at 1034–42.
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explains, there are essentially two dimensions to this—the rise of
union-sponsored pensions as prominent institutional investors and
the fall of union organizations themselves as labor representatives.
Since the 1970s, “defined benefit” pensions, under which
employers are obligated to meet a certain payout level and bear
investment risk to meet that obligation, have increasingly given
way to “defined contribution” pensions (such as 401(k) and 403(b)
plans), under which employers’ sole obligation is to provide the
promised contributions. Critically, defined contribution plans
place the investment risk associated with meeting a desired
payout level on the employees themselves.121 According to a
report of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration,
from 1977 to 2007, “the number of participants in defined contribution plans increased 358 percent (from 14.6 million to 66.9
million workers) compared to a 31 percent decrease in defined
benefit plan . . . participants (from 28.1 million workers to 19.4
million workers).”122 Whereas 65.8 percent of workers with
employer-sponsored retirement plans in 1977 had defined benefit
plans, by 1997 “the percentages had completely reversed,” with
67.8 percent then having defined contribution plans.123 By 2007,
77.5 percent had defined contribution plans.124
This shift has effectively turned a large swathe of American
working families into investors, partially merging employee and
investor identities in public discourse. As Martin Gelter has
observed, in a defined contribution plan, “an employee is a
shareholder, namely either a diversified investor in the capital
market or in his own employer through an ESOP” (an employee
stock ownership plan)—a shift that naturally tends to predispose
employees themselves to look more favorably upon shareholder-

121. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2010-10-097, STATISTICAL
TRENDS IN RETIREMENT PLANS 2, 5–8 (Aug. 9, 2010); Gelter, The Pension System, supra note
75, at 921–25.
122. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 121, at 7.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. For additional background on these dramatic shifts, see EMP. BENEFITS SEC.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DOLOPS14D0017, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN
HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS 1975–2014 (Sept. 2016).
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centric policies.125 Interestingly, the data still confirm that “the
shareholder class . . . retains elite characteristics.” The “modal
shareholder” (revealed by a study of the Fed’s Survey of
Consumer Finances and IRS data) is “rich, old, and white.”126
These trends have, however, undeniably altered the politics of
corporate governance and fueled the perception that various
socioeconomic strata, notably the “middle class,” have a
substantial stake in the capital market—and that the value of that
stake would be materially enhanced by embrace of shareholdercentric policies.127
More pertinently, for purposes of understanding the state/
federal divide in left-leaning corporate governance preferences,
these developments have radically altered the position of
organized labor via their associated pensions, which manage
substantial retirement assets and accordingly find themselves in
the position of shareholders—a shift in posture that has been
reinforced by attenuation of traditional union activities as union
membership declines. “Since its peak in 1954 at approximately
25 million workers or 39.2% of the U.S. workforce, the number of
organized laborers has declined to 15.4 million or 12% of the U.S.
workforce in 2006.”128 In light of these trends, with their pensions
looming larger and their traditional organizing activities fading
125. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 943, 946–48; see also Natalie C. Cotton
Nessler & Gerald F. Davis, Stock Ownership, Political Beliefs, and Party Identification from the
“Ownership Society” to the Financial Meltdown, 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 2–3 (2012).
126. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 490–91 (2013).
127. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note
40, at 275–86; Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose, supra note 4, at 553–60; see also
GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF
A NEW ECONOMY 61–65 (2016).
128. Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders:
Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 191–92 (2012); see also Megan Dunn &
James Walker, Union Membership in the United States, Spotlight on Statistics, U.S. DEP’T LAB.
BUREAU LAB. STAT. 1–5 (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-member
ship-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf (reporting that
union membership in the private sector has fallen substantially since the 1980s, and that
“five industries accounted for 81 percent of [private sector] union members in 2015,”
including education and health services at 1.9 million, manufacturing at 1.4 million,
transportation and utilities at 1.1 million, construction at 940,000, and wholesale and retail
trade at 871,000); Graham K. Wilson, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, in 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN P OLITICS 50, 51–52 (David Coates
ed., 2012).
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from their prior significance, “obtaining a good return on their
investments for aging members became relatively more important.”129
A substantial percentage of union pension fund assets are
invested in U.S. stocks,130 reflecting the fact that equities are “the
only type of investment to yield profits that are high enough ‘to
make retirement income programs work.’”131 Indeed, the need to
generate returns sufficient to meet current obligations represents a
critical driver of institutional investors’ behavior more generally.
For example, public pension plans (generally structured as
defined benefit plans) “have historically assumed an annual rate
of return of 8% give or take a half point” in order to fund current
obligations—an impossibility for most since the financial crisis,
prompting “a focus on short-term stock price performance” and
“high turnover rates.”132 Similar challenges face employersponsored pensions (particularly those that remain defined benefit plans), as well as other forms of institutional investors.133
Naturally, these practical realities condition policy preferences, and there are certainly areas in which shareholders and
workers easily find common cause. Workers might join shareholders in favoring greater transparency as a means of ensuring
job security (e.g., by promoting better accounting and reducing
managerial “moral hazard”) and constraining executive compensation “widely perceived as excessive by shareholders and
workers alike.”134 Predictably, workers become more likely to
align with such a “transparency coalition” when their “financial

129. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 956; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 126, at 513–14; Eugene Scalia, The New Labor Activism, WALL STREET J., Jan. 23, 2008,
at A24.
130. See Agrawal, supra note 128, at 192 (“Approximately 46% of all union pension
assets are invested in domestic equities as of September 30, 2006.”).
131. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 928.
132. Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 930–32.
133. See id. at 933–34; see also PYRAMIS GLOBAL ADVISORS, US TAFT-HARTLEY (UNION):
MOVING FORWARD DESPITE UNCERTAINTY 4 (Leadership Series: 2013 Pyramis US TaftHartley (Union) Pulse Poll, 2013) (“Generating greater risk-adjusted returns may be one of
the only viable ways for Taft-Hartley [defined benefit] plans to grow their assets.”);
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 121, at 5, 12–13 (observing that
many defined benefit plans are underfunded).
134. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 113, at 209.
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share increases,” as straightforwardly occurs when pension assets
are invested in stocks.135
There has been considerable debate regarding whether, in fact,
advocacy efforts by union pensions have been truly focused on
maximizing shareholder wealth, or rather have tended to advance
labor interests (for example, by targeting companies with labor
problems).136 To date, the empirical literature on union pension
fund incentives, and the effects of their advocacy, remains
mixed.137 One study found that “AFL-CIO-affiliated shareholders
become significantly less opposed to directors once the AFL-CIO
labor organization no longer represents a firm’s workers”—a
pattern differing from other forms of institutional investors138 and
straightforwardly in tension with legal obligations imposed upon
pension fund management under federal law.139 Others, however,
examining the impact of “labor union-sponsored shareholder
proposals” on various shareholder and labor interests, generally
find no “observable patterns,” although there are limited circumstances where union proposals appear to have consequentially
advanced shareholder interests, or to have increased unionization
rates, respectively.140
Accordingly, it appears that union pension fund activism
could plausibly advance shareholder interests, or worker/union
interests, as the case may be—and these mixed findings may

135. Darcillon, supra note 35, at 667–68; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 126,
at 513–14.
136. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90, at 1816–17 (“[U]nion and state
and local pension funds are precisely the shareholders most likely to use their positions to
self-deal . . . or to otherwise reap private benefits not shared with other investors.”); Scalia,
supra note 129 (describing, in 2008, “a reported AFL-CIO plan to promote shareholder
proposals that press companies to offer more generous employee health-care benefits”).
137. See, e.g., Agrawal, supra note 128, at 189; Jay B. Kesten, Shareholder Political
Primacy, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 161, 201–03 (2016); Andrew K. Prevost et al., Labor Unions as
Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors?, 47 FIN. REV. 327, 330 (2012).
138. Agrawal, supra note 128, at 187; see also David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Union
Activism: Do Union Pension Funds Act Solely in the Interest of Beneficiaries? 2–3 (Stanford
Closer Look Series, 2012).
139. See infra Section III.E.
140. Prevost et al., supra note 137, at 327, 342–44 (“[M]ajority support of proposals
interact to produce more independent boards following targeting with a statistically
stronger effect within the unionized portion of the sample. . . . Targets that have no initial
union presence show a significant increase in unionization over the following three years
following targeting.”).
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simply illustrate the contradictory position in which unions and
their associated pension funds have found themselves over recent
decades.141 As Richard Marens has described,
[O]rganized labor has explored ways to use its capital as a tool to
create new union jobs, back unionized companies with
investment funds, set up “worker-owner councils” in a few cities
to discuss issues with local corporations, and establish mutual
funds that channeled union pension plans toward workerfriendly public corporations.142

He concludes, however, that “it is difficult to claim that these
efforts have done a great deal for organized labor in the United
States,” given substantial drops in wages and unionization
rates,143 and that in fact “labor’s financial activism has . . . done
more for capital than it has . . . accomplished for labor.”144
Following a period of limited, and often labor-oriented,
activism in the 1970s and early 1980s, union pension fund
activism began to change fundamentally in the mid-1980s following alignment with the Council of Institutional Investors, which
strongly emphasized corporate governance reform. “Organized
labor had never before promoted governance reform, which has
typically included reducing barriers to potential takeovers,”
Marens writes, even though some unions had “assisted companies
in establishing legal barriers to takeovers during the height of the
frenzy in the 1980s, for fear of downsizing or union busting by the
raider.”145 In the early 1990s, then, foreign investments “posed an
141. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2000, 2040–41 (2014) (describing a union shareholder proposal to redeem
a poison pill); Prevost et al., supra note 137, at 328 (“[T]he dual role of labor unions as
collective bargaining agents and as stewards of their members’ pension funds means that
they are fraught with an inherent conflict of interest.”); Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31,
at 645–46, 649–51 (observing that short-termism among pension funds breeds shorttermism among corporate management, and that increased shareholder-centrism leads to
lower worker pay and potentially discourages collective bargaining).
142. Marens, supra note 4, at 109.
143. Id. at 117–18.
144. Id. at 110.
145. Id. at 113; see also, History, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV., http://www.cii.org
/cii_history (last visited June 25, 2018) [hereinafter COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV.] (“Our
voting membership has grown to more than 125 public, union and corporate employee
benefit plans, endowments and foundations with combined assets that exceed
$3.5 trillion.”); Prevost et al., supra note 137, at 333–35 (finding that a “common theme
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especially sharp conflict for the labor funds,” as union
organizations themselves had no interest in “subsidizing the loss
of American jobs,” yet their pension funds naturally sought strong
returns—including abroad—in order to support benefits payments.146 Overall, however, the “effort and resources they have
expended on behalf of organized labor have made it legally and
organizationally easier for shareholders to communicate, organize, put forward proposals, and compel management to change
its behavior.”147
E. Unintended Regulatory Consequences in External Regulation
It is important to observe that the mere fact of conflicting
incentives does not explain why an actor’s behavior would break
in one or the other direction. Understanding why organized
labor’s activism has tended so heavily to favor the empowerment
and interests of shareholders at the federal level—in stark contrast
with their impact, and the traditional conceptualization of their
interests, at the level of state corporate law—requires some
account of the legal rules and other constraints within which
union pension funds operate.
As with many complex phenomena involving the interaction
of regulatory constraints and market forces, there is plenty of
room for the law of unintended consequences to operate—and
that is all the more true at the federal level, where policymakers
have to address a much broader array of issues involving a much
broader array of constituencies.148 At least two such instances
have arisen at the federal level with the unintended consequence
of substantially bolstering the degree of shareholder-centrism
prevailing in U.S. corporate governance, one involving tax and the
other—perhaps ironically—involving labor regulation intended to
protect workers.

addressed by union-sponsored shareholder proposals is the elimination of antitakeover
devices” and that such proposals “met with the greatest degree of success,” particularly
those addressing poison pills).
146. Allen R. Myerson, Labor Unions Flex Pension Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993, § 3,
at 15.
147. Marens, supra note 4, at 120.
148. Cf. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 104, at 2499–504.
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On the tax side, in response to perceived excesses in the
compensation of public company executives, Congress amended
the Internal Revenue Code in 1993 to provide that compensation
beyond $1 million would be deductible for the corporation (as a
business expense) only if performance based.149 The result, however, was not the desired reduction in executive compensation but
rather an explosion in the equity-based component of executives’
overall compensation packages. This strongly skewed management incentives in large public companies toward a narrow focus
on stock price, which in turn (among other things) is thought to
have contributed to the climate of excessive risk-taking that led to
the recent financial crisis.150
The other such instance of unintended regulatory consequences, which is directly pertinent to the political questions
addressed here, stems from the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),151 a federal law enacted in 1974 to ensure
responsible management of pension assets in private employersponsored retirement funds. “ERISA imposed more severe
regulatory burdens on [defined-benefit] plans than [definedcontribution] plans,” creating a substantial skew toward definedcontribution plans and undermining the bonding effect between
labor and management that defined-benefit plans had forged.152
Additionally, ERISA imposed fiduciary duties upon plan managers153 that have virtually required them not only to focus intently
on maximizing returns to the plan as corporate shareholders but
to engage in strong-form activism to enhance the overall degree of
shareholder-centrism prevailing in U.S. corporateµ governance.
149. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note
40, at 173–74.
150. For additional background, see Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of
Crisis, supra note 68, at 316–17. Note that the recently enacted “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” has
“remove[d] the exception . . . for qualified performance-based compensation, making it
subject to the $1 million deduction limit for taxable years commencing after Dec. 31, 2017.”
Joseph E. Bachelder III, Executive Pay at Public Corporations After Code §162(m) Changes, N.Y.
L.J. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/03/22/executive
-pay-at-public-corporations-after-code-%C2%A7162m-changes/.
151. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2018).
152. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 929–32 (observing that definedbenefit plans incentivized labor to remain with their employer and, to the degree underfunded, deterred “driving a very hard bargain”).
153. Id. at 956.
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ERISA requires pension fund fiduciaries to manage employees’ retirement assets prudently and loyally, which, in this
context, has been taken to require a single-minded focus on
generating returns to pay benefits to pension beneficiaries. “Employee welfare benefit plans” and “employee pension benefit
plans”154 are required to maintain “a written instrument” that
“shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or
severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation
and administration of the plan,” which authority may be delegated to “an investment manager or managers to manage
(including the power to acquire and dispose of) any assets of a
plan.”155 Plan management, then, is subject to fiduciary duties
spelled out in the statute. Notably, a plan fiduciary “shall
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries” and “for the exclusive purpose
of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.”156
In other words, the statute requires strict loyalty to plan
beneficiaries, an obligation that has come to be understood to
require intense focus on maximizing plan assets, as described
below. Additionally, a plan fiduciary must act “with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”157 This
specifically includes “diversifying the investments of the plan so
as to minimize the risk of large losses” (unless prudence dictates
otherwise).158 Such fiduciaries must also act “in accordance with
the documents and instruments governing the plan.”159 These
provisions essentially impose duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience similar to those arising in other fiduciary contexts.
Consistent with the foregoing, ERISA expressly prohibits various
forms of transactions that straightforwardly involve conflicts of

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)–(3) (2012).
Id. § 1102(a)(1), (c)(3).
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
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interest, including “use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest,
of any assets of the plan”160—a provision that would appear
straightforwardly to preclude voting securities held by the plan
for the benefit of anyone other than beneficiaries. Fiduciaries who
breach these duties
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses . . . and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate.161

An interesting—and certainly ironic—consequence of the
intense focus on maximizing plan assets mandated by ERISA’s
fiduciary duties is that interpretations of these statutory requirements promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) over
the years have been among the most consequential, and highly
shareholder-centric, regulatory documents affecting corporate
governance to have arisen in any U.S. legal setting. The DOL has
stated in an interpretive bulletin that the “fiduciary act of
managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes
the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock”162—a
position virtually requiring active engagement by pension plans
as shareholders of the companies in which they invest.
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that there was a spike in “laborsponsored resolutions that reached a vote” following adoption of
this policy position in the 1990s.163 In exercising such voting
powers, then, the DOL interpretive bulletin essentially requires
intense focus on profit maximization. The DOL explains that
ERISA’s fiduciary duties
require that, in voting proxies, the responsible fiduciary consider
those factors that may affect the value of the plan’s investment
and not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in
their retirement income to unrelated objectives. . . . The named

160. Id. § 1106(a)(1)(D).
161. Id. § 1109(a).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01(1) (2017) (“Interpretive bulletin relating to the exercise of

shareholder rights and written statements of investment policy, including proxy voting
policies or guidelines.”); see also Larcker & Tayan, supra note 138, at 1.
163. Marens, supra note 4, at 113–14.
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fiduciary must carry out this responsibility solely in the interests
of the participants and beneficiaries and without regard to its
relationship to the plan sponsor.164

The categorical nature of this injunction bears emphasizing: the
DOL underscores that ERISA fiduciary duties “require” focus on
investment value and that the fiduciary cannot “subordinate”
investment value to “unrelated objectives.”
The impact of the DOL’s statement goes further, however,
effectively requiring active pursuit of greater shareholdercentrism in corporate governance. The DOL interprets ERISA’s
fiduciary duties not merely to require engaged proxy voting
focusing on “the value of the plan’s investment” but affirmative
shareholder activism.165 In the same interpretive bulletin, the DOL
endorses “maintenance . . . of a statement of investment policy” as
“consistent with the fiduciary obligations set forth in ERISA[,]”166
a signal strongly suggesting that the DOL would look askance at
failure to maintain such a statement. The bulletin elaborates, then,
that “a statement of proxy voting policy would be an important
part of any comprehensive statement of investment policy”167 and
indicates that an
investment policy that contemplates activities intended to
monitor or influence the management of corporations in which
the plan owns stock is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations
under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that
there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or
communication with management . . . is likely to enhance the
value of the plan’s investment.168

Lest the significance of this quasi-injunction be lost on plan
fiduciaries,169 in another passage worth quoting at length, the DOL
identifies governance-related topics upon which plan fiduciaries

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01(1) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2509.2016-01(2).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 2509.2016-01(3) (“Shareholder Engagement”).
Cf. Strine, Toward Common Sense, supra note 43, at 5–6 (suggesting that shareholder proposals are pursued instrumentally to demonstrate compliance with ERISA
fiduciary duties).
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might engage, and even potential means of imposing their views,
again with a single-minded focus on profit maximization:
Active monitoring and communication activities would generally concern such issues as the independence and expertise of
candidates for the corporation’s board of directors and assuring
that the board has sufficient information to carry out its
responsibility to monitor management. Other issues may include
such matters as governance structures and practices, particularly
those involving board composition, executive compensation,
transparency and accountability in corporate decision-making,
responsiveness to shareholders, the corporation’s policy regarding mergers and acquisitions, the extent of debt financing
and capitalization, the nature of long-term business plans
including plans on climate change preparedness and sustainability, governance and compliance policies and practices for
avoiding criminal liability and ensuring employees comply with
applicable laws and regulations, the corporation’s workforce
practices (e.g., investment in training to develop its work force,
diversity, equal employment opportunity), policies and practices
to address environmental or social factors that have an impact
on shareholder value, and other financial and non-financial
measures of corporate performance. Active monitoring and communication may be carried out through a variety of methods including
by means of correspondence and meetings with corporate management
as well as by exercising the legal rights of a shareholder.170

In no uncertain terms, the DOL’s guidance conveys to plan
fiduciaries that the DOL expects them to engage with management on a host of governance-related issues; that in so engaging,
their single-minded focus is to be maximizing plan assets; and
that considerable exertion toward this end is expected—not
merely through “correspondence and meetings,” but potentially
including “exercising the legal rights of a share-holder,”171 leaving
to the imagination whether the DOL has in mind the shareholder
franchise, shareholder proposals, lawsuits, or all of the above.
The thrust of this guidance has hardly been lost on the
marketplace. The interpretive bulletin described above was

170. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01(3) (emphasis added).
171. Id.
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adopted in late 2016, revising prior guidance on these matters, to
encourage further “voting [of] proxies and engaging in other
prudent exercises of shareholder rights” (by removing any
implication that elaborate “cost-benefit analysis” is required in all
instances to justify such action).172 In adopting these revisions, the
DOL stated that the “existence of financial benefits associated
with shareholder engagement is suggested by the fact that a
growing number of institutional investors are now engaging
companies on [environmental, social, or governance] issues,”
adding that “[o]ther market developments further substantiate the
financial benefits from shareholder engagement.”173 These statements underscore the DOL’s expectation of affirmative shareholder activism by ERISA fiduciaries, prompting market observers
to predict that “[s]hareholder activism could increase this year in
the wake of [this] new Labor Department guidance.”174
A related area with which the DOL has been concerned, and
where the Department’s vacillation over time has reflected some
ambivalence regarding the degree to which plan fiduciaries must
act as financially driven shareholders, involves the selection of
plan investments. The DOL has been particularly unsure how to
handle so-called “economically targeted investments” (ETIs),
which are “selected for the economic benefits they create apart
from their investment return to the employee benefit plan.”175
Whereas under Republican administrations the DOL had
“discouraged, if not forbidden, efforts by pension funds to pursue
social goals,” the Clinton administration “generally favor[ed]
broader labor rights and the channeling of investments to create
jobs.”176 An interpretive bulletin issued by the DOL in 1994

172. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written
Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 Fed.
Reg. 95879, 95879–80 (Dec. 29, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (providing
“supplemental views” associated with DOL’s withdrawal of Interpretive Bulletin 2008-2
and adoption of Interpretive Bulletin 2016-1, “which reinstates the language of Interpretive
Bulletin 94-2 with certain modifications”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (repealed 2016).
173. Interpretive Bulletin, supra note 172, at 95881.
174. See Michael Greene, DOL Guidance Sparking Corporate Fears of More Activism in
2017, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 4, 2017).
175. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2017) (“Interpretive bulletin relating to the fiduciary
standard under ERISA in considering economically targeted investments.”).
176. Myerson, supra note 146, at 15.
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endorsed such investments as long as they generated a
competitive return for the plan relative to the risks involved—an
apparent effort to square “social investing” with ERISA’s fiduciary duties, which was criticized for potentially creating “inappropriate pressures to make such investments.”177
In 2008, this approach was superseded by a new bulletin
reflecting “a series of interpretive positions taken by the DOL in
individual letters” over intervening years that effectively carved
back at ETIs, clarifying that the cases where such investments
would be viewed as consistent with ERISA’s fiduciary duties were
“very limited.”178 Plan fiduciaries would have to be prepared to
show that the ETI and available alternative investments were
“economically indistinguishable,” meaning “truly equal, taking
into account a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the economic impact on the plan” before the ETI could be selected.179 This
2008 bulletin was itself superseded in 2015,180 however, when the
DOL apparently abandoned entirely the concept of having a
distinct test or approach to ETIs. The new 2015 guidance simply
directs plan fiduciaries to a previously issued regulation on
ERISA’s prudence requirements and states that any investment
“will not be prudent if it would be expected to provide a plan
with a lower rate of return than available alternative investments
with commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier than alternative
available investments with commensurate rates of return.”181 The
DOL here emphasizes that the “fiduciary standards applicable to
ETIs are no different than the standards applicable to plan
investments generally.”182

177. Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted
Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
333, 347–48 (1995) (observing that “groups expecting to benefit from ETIs have strong
incentives to compel such trustees to declare ties,” permitting investment in ETIs under the
DOL’s 1994 formulation).
178. Donald P. Carleen et al., DOL Issues Economically Targeted Investment and Proxy
Voting Guidance 1–2 (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications
/998D0DCCAAAE080E1ECAEA4F475A4424.pdf (quoting the 2008 interpretive bulletin).
179. Id. (quoting the 2008 interpretive bulletin).
180. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (repealed 2015).
181. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2017).
182. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2017) (“Investment duties.”).
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In light of the foregoing, we should hardly be shocked to find
pension fiduciaries subject to ERISA, and those advising them,
advocating strongly shareholder-centric conceptions of corporate
governance. This is readily apparent, for example, in proxy voting
guidelines promulgated for union pensions. Union pension funds
that are “affiliated with the same umbrella organization” typically
“synchronize their proxy voting decisions by employing a thirdparty fiduciary” who “cast[s] votes in consultation with the head
officers of the umbrella labor organization under which the
individual union funds are associated”—the “AFL-CIO Office of
Investment” being a prominent example.183 In the AFL-CIO’s case,
their proxy voting guidelines are expressly aimed at compliance
with “fiduciary duties as outlined in [ERISA] and subsequent
[DOL] policy statements,” particularly the duty of loyalty and the
exclusive purpose rule.184 The guidelines leave little doubt that the
AFL-CIO hears the DOL loud and clear regarding the imperative
of focusing exclusively on maximizing plan assets and the de facto
expectation that fiduciaries will engage in shareholder activism,185
and “AFL-CIO union pensions funds are,” in fact, regarded as
“some of the most involved shareholder activists.”186 While the
guidelines express regard for the interests of “important corporate
constituents such as . . . employees and the communities in which
they operate,” and preserve some capacity to support “corporate
responsibility or social issue shareholder proposals,” in both
instances the guidelines carefully cabin such considerations by
reference to “long-term” corporate success.187 The guidelines
indeed express commitment to long-term decision-making
throughout,188 blaming recent corporate scandals and the financial
crisis on “executives [who] sacrifice[d] long-term value creation
for short-term greed.”189 Yet the guidelines endorse numerous
corporate governance structures that strongly empower

183. Agrawal, supra note 128, at 192–93; see also Marens, supra note 4, at 115–16.
184. AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: EXERCISING AUTHORITY, RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 31–35

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

(2012).
See id. at 26–32, 35.
Agrawal, supra note 128, at 193.
AFL-CIO, supra note 184, at 5, 20–21.
See id. at 1, 4, 11–17.
Id. at 1.
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shareholders190—a tendency widely associated with union
activism, and short-termism, in the literature.191
While state and municipal employee pension funds are
regulated by applicable state laws, “ERISA fiduciary principles
often are found in state law as well,”192 prompting similar
responses. This is vividly illustrated by the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), “the nation’s largest
public pension fund,”193 which is subject to very similar fiduciary
duties under California state law and has adopted proxy voting
guidelines that resemble those adopted by the AFL-CIO in
pertinent respects.194 California’s constitution states that “the
retirement board of a public pension or retirement system shall
have . . . fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and
administration of the system” and requires fund management “in
a manner that will assure prompt delivery of benefits and related
services to the participants and their beneficiaries.”195 As under
ERISA, this provision states that plan assets “are trust funds and
shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to
participants . . . and their beneficiaries.”196 Duties of loyalty and
care resembling ERISA duties apply, including an obligation to
manage the plan “solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive
purposes of providing benefits to, participants and their
beneficiaries” and to do so “with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
person acting in a like capacity and familiar with these matters

190. See id. at 3–20.
191. See, e.g., Agrawal, supra note 128, at 193–94 (“[L]abor union activists support

proposals that further increase shareholder powers . . . .”); Gelter, The Pension System, supra
note 75, at 957–58 (“[U]nion activism has to a large degree helped the cause of shareholder
primacy.”); Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31, at 645–46 (associating pensions’ need to
generate “short-term returns” with short-termism in corporate governance).
192. AFL-CIO, supra note 184, at 23, 26.
193. CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS. (CALPERS), GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 7
(updated Mar. 14, 2016) [hereinafter CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES].
194. While “fiduciary status and responsibilities with respect to state and local
governmental funds are determined primarily by the states and common law of the 50
states,” in litigation “the state courts can and do look to ERISA standards and federal court
decisions for guidance in interpreting and applying common-law trust principles.” AFLCIO, supra note 184, at 26.
195. CAL. CONST., art. XVI, § 17 (2016).
196. Id.
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would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims.”197 State statutes accordingly prohibit conflict
transactions198 and reiterate the duty to manage the plan “solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” for “the
exclusive purpose of . . . [p]roviding benefits.”199
As at the federal level, these requirements have predictably
impacted CalPERS’s plan documents, which again aim first and
foremost to ensure compliance with fiduciary duties.200 As under
ERISA, California’s state-law fiduciary duties are interpreted to
embrace proxy voting and various “engagement strategies,” with
the “primary performance objective” being “long-term target riskadjusted return.”201 Limited capacity to consider social and
environmental issues is squared with applicable fiduciary duties,
principally through reference to long-term sustainability and riskmanagement considerations.202 Yet once again a number of highly
shareholder-centric corporate governance structures are advocated203—governance structures perhaps reflecting the fact that, as
CalPERS itself emphasizes, their investments “fund around twothirds of [their] pension payments every year,” placing a
particular premium on “ensuring that [their] investments . . .
generate the highest possible returns.”204 Their discussion of
“engagement strategies” conveys that they are more than willing
to assert themselves in order to achieve this imperative, including
not only “[d]irect engagement” with corporate management but
also “director nominations, filing shareowner proposals, proxy

197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 20150, 20153 (West 2017).
Id. § 20151.
See CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS. (CALPERS), STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY FOR
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1 (2015) [hereinafter CALPERS, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY].
201. Id. at 1–3; see also CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 9–10.
202. See CALPERS, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY, supra note 200, at 1; CALPERS,
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 7, 23–26, 33–36, 41.
203. See CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 12–20, 26–33.
204. Id. at 7; see also Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 930–33
(discussing the pressures placed upon corporate managers to focus on short-term returns
emanating from public pension funds’ current payment obligations); Pendleton & Gospel,
supra note 31, at 645–46.
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solicitations, director withhold vote campaigns, and strategic
investor collaboration.”205
F. National Party Politics
The foregoing discussion of the evolution of organized labor’s
interests, and how they have been impacted by regulatory
developments in federal labor law, help explain why this critical
stakeholder group would have come to favor decidedly shareholder-centric corporate governance structures. This does not in
itself, however, explain how and why such preferences have
found such a congenial home in the national politics of the U.S.
center-left, or how and why a larger political coalition committed
to such views—or at least finding them a convenient component
of a larger political platform—would have taken shape over recent
decades. This final section of Part III takes up that question.
As a threshold matter, it is quite striking that shareholdercentric corporate governance reforms have—across a range of
countries including the United States—been prompted by centerleft parties.206 This is surprising because one would expect shareholder-centric corporate governance structures “to conflict with
traditional left-wing political commitments to working-class and
low-income constituencies.”207 Moreover, compelling theoretical
work in comparative corporate governance has associated leftleaning politics with stakeholder-oriented corporate laws and
right-leaning politics with shareholder-oriented corporate laws.208
Yet in cases as diverse as the United States, Germany, France, and
Italy, Cioffi and Höpner find that over recent decades “center-left
political parties were the driving force behind corporate
205. CALPERS, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY, supra note 200, at 3; see also
CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 9–10. This posture is broadly
representative of institutional investors generally. See COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV., supra
note 145 (observing that the organization was formed by institutions that “felt that by
pooling their resources, institutional investors could use their burgeoning proxy power to
hold companies accountable”).
206. See generally CIOFFI, supra note 28; Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27.
207. Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 464.
208. See generally MARK J. ROE, P OLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (paperback ed. 2006). See also BRUNER,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40, at 119–23 (discussing Roe’s social democracy theory).
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governance reform and the institutional adjustment to finance
capitalism.”209 They also found that associated “political actors”
have themselves “taken the lead in advancing corporate governance reform” (as opposed to “unions, shareholders, or other
interest groups”), suggesting a strong imperative emanating from
broader party politics.210 These findings are difficult to square
with the broader theoretical work noted above, and with the
views that traditional political affiliations would lead us to
expect—although it has been suggested in more recent work,
building on such comparative analyses, that the key to reconciling
them may be to focus on political shifts over time. In particular,
Thibault Darcillon has observed that shareholder-centric reforms
have correlated with rightward shifts in party politics, including
rightward shifts among left-leaning parties toward the center of
the political spectrum.211 This trend, Darcillon finds, is observable
across various OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development) countries,212 rendering the striking association
of center-left parties with shareholder-centric corporate governance reforms at least broadly compatible with research that
correlates stockholding with more right-leaning politics.213 Such
shifts over time may also help explain some of the more notable
disjunctures described above—say, labor’s support of state-level
anti-takeover laws in the 1980s and their more recent support for
efforts to dismantle takeover defenses starting in the 1990s.
Indeed, the trends discussed above appear clearly to have
been operative in the United States, where the period of intensely
shareholder-centric reforms since the 1990s maps coherently onto
the rise of the so-called “New Democrats”—a movement, closely
associated with the ascendance of President Bill Clinton, that
decidedly shifted the Democratic Party toward the political
center.214 The rise of the New Democrats reflected a strong pivot

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 464 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 491.
See Darcillon, supra note 35, at 661–69, 686–93; see also Roe, supra note 109, at 89–90.
See Darcillon, supra note 35, at 673–84.
See Nessler & Davis, supra note 125, at 5, 12–13.
See generally FROM, supra note 25 (providing a history of the New Democrats,
with a foreword by Bill Clinton). See also Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 491; Darcillon,
supra note 35, at 668–69; Andrew Leigh, The Rise and Fall of the Third Way, 75 AQ:
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toward the center-left in the late 1980s and the 1990s, responding
to the party’s near inability to win national elections in the 1970s
and 1980s.215 The “Democratic Leadership Council,” formed in
1985 outside the formal party apparatus,216 viewed itself as “the
venue for redefining the Democratic Party”217—a posture that
brought with it more right-leaning policies, such as promotion of
international trade, creating tensions with labor unions.218 The
core themes animating this pivot toward the center were
“opportunity, responsibility, and community,”219 and policies
pursued under this banner drew from both traditionally liberal
and traditionally conservative ideas. This effectively wedded commitment to civil rights and civil liberties with both rejection of
outcomes-based social welfare policy and pursuit of deficit reduction and trade liberalization as means of achieving economic
growth.220 This shift toward the center has been credited with
helping propel Bill Clinton to victory in the 1992 presidential
race,221 and these themes are clearly reflected in Democratic Party
platforms since the early 1990s.222 They have also inspired similar
AUSTRALIAN Q., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 10, 12; Graham K. Wilson, Clinton, Bill, in 1 THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 203, 203 (David Coates ed., 2012).
215. See FROM, supra note 25 at 5–6 (observing that Jimmy Carter lost forty-four states
in the 1980 election, that Walter Mondale lost forty-nine states in the 1984 election, and that
Michael Dukakis’s loss in 1988 “marked the fifth Democratic defeat in six presidential
cycles, a losing streak interrupted only by Jimmy Carter’s narrow victory in 1976 in the
wake of the Watergate scandal”); Flavio Romano, Clinton and Blair: The Economics of the
Third Way, 10 J. ECON. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 3 (2006) (describing such a shift from the left toward
the center as an electoral imperative). These difficulties have been variously attributed to
the party’s loss of Southern Democrats following the civil rights movement, weakening of
the anticommunism consensus following the Vietnam conflict, and mistrust among middle
class voters on issues including defense and the economy. See, e.g., FROM, supra note 25, at
8–10, 102–05; Marjorie Randon Hershey, Democratic Party, in 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN POLITICS 262, 265–66 (David Coates ed., 2012); Nicol C. Rae, Republican Party, in 2
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 275, 275–76 (David Coates ed., 2012).
216. See FROM, supra note 25, at 53.
217. Id. at 110.
218. See id. at 68, 146–48, 204–09; see also THOMAS FRANK, LISTEN, LIBERAL: OR, WHAT
EVER HAPPENED TO THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE? 44–51 (2016).
219. FROM, supra note 25, at 148.
220. See id. at 128–29; see also FRANK, supra note 218, at 30–33.
221. See generally FROM, supra note 25.
222. For background on party platforms, see generally AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php (last visited June 25, 2018) (compiled by John
T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters and hosted by the University of California, Santa Barbara).
For the Democratic Party’s platforms from 1992 to 2012 (in chronological order), see the
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shifts toward the center among left-leaning parties in other
countries, often referred to collectively as representing “Third
Way” politics—a particularly noteworthy example being Tony
Blair’s “New Labour” strategy in the United Kingdom.223
Given the nature of this shift away from what are often
regarded as paradigmatic left-wing commitments, it is hardly
surprising that “Third Way” politics have given rise to heated
debates—notably regarding whether this shift in fact amounts to a

following: Democratic Party, A New Covenant with the American People (July 13, 1992),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29610 (1992 Democratic Party Platform emphasizing themes of “opportunity,” “responsibility,” and “community,” and
“reject[ing] both the do-nothing government of the last twelve years and the big government theory that says we can hamstring business and tax and spend our way to prosperity”); Democratic Party, Today’s Democratic Party: Meeting America’s Challenges, Protecting
America’s Values (Aug. 26, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
29611 (1996 Democratic Party Platform emphasizing similar themes and praising deficit
reduction, “open and fair trade,” and “national welfare reform”); Democratic Party, 2000
Democratic Party Platform (Aug. 14, 2000), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php
?pid=29612 (2000 Democratic Party Platform similarly emphasizing “our basic American
values of hard work, community, embracing diversity, faith, family, and personal responsibility,” with similar policy prescriptions); Democratic Party, 2004 Democratic Party
Platform (July 27, 2004), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29613 (“The
simple bargain at the heart of the American Dream offers opportunity to every American
who takes the responsibility to make the most of it.”); Democratic Party, Renewing America’s
Promise (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=78283 (“Today,
we pledge a return to core moral principles like stewardship, service to others, personal
responsibility, shared sacrifice and a fair shot for all . . . .”); Democratic Party, Moving
America Forward (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=
101962 (2012 Democratic Party Platform advancing “the simple principle that in America,
hard work should pay off, responsibility should be rewarded, and each one of us should be
able to go as far as our talent and drive take us”).
223. For additional background on the spread of “Third Way” politics from Clinton’s
Democratic Party to self-styled center-left parties elsewhere, see generally Niall Dickson,
What is the Third Way?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/458626
.stm; Andrew Gamble, The Meaning of the Third Way, in THE BLAIR EFFECT 2001–5, at 430,
430 (Anthony Seldon & Dennis Kavanagh eds., 2005); A NTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY
AND ITS CRITICS (2000) [hereinafter GIDDENS, CRITICS]; Anthony Giddens, The Third Way
Revisited, POL’Y NETWORK (June 28, 2010), http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail
.aspx?ID=3868&title=The+Third+Way+revisited [hereinafter Giddens, The Third Way
Revisited]; John Judis, Is the Third Way Finished?, AM. PROSPECT (June 17, 2002), http://
prospect.org/article/third-way-finished; James Petras, The Third Way: Myth and Reality, 51
MONTHLY REV. 10 (Mar. 1, 2000), http://monthlyreview.org/2000/03/01/the-third-way/;
Romano, supra note 215. See also Lewis Baston & Simon Henig, The Labour Party, in THE
BLAIR EFFECT 2001–5, at 112, 120–21 (Anthony Seldon & Dennis Kavanagh eds., 2005);
FROM, supra note 25, at 239–48.
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clever repackaging of neoliberalism.224 The proposition is certainly
contestable,225 but there appears to be little doubt that New
Democratic politics in the United States have involved a concerted
effort to appeal to the elite, highly educated professional class—
including financial professionals. As Cioffi observes, in the 1990s
“the Democrats in the United States . . . embraced much of the
ascendant neoliberal conception of finance capitalism as the route
to economic modernization and growth.”226 He elaborates, “The
promise of faster economic growth and innovation fostered by
rapid capital formation and reallocation via well-developed
financial markets and facilitated by financially driven corporate
restructuring appealed . . . in an era marked by chronic budget
constraints and the limits of industrial policy.”227 This shift went
hand-in-hand with growing rhetorical and policy emphasis on the
importance of education, which tended to legitimize the shift
away from outcomes-based social welfare policy—the idea being,
in Thomas Frank’s words, “You get what you deserve, and what
you deserve is defined by how you did in school.”228 At the same
time, it implicitly exalted highly educated professionals, including
financial professionals, who are often socially liberal and, of
course, wealthy potential donors. Courting the professional class
placed a positive face on policy shifts that might otherwise be
regarded as callous toward the less affluent, through a constituency that appeared to mediate capital and labor insofar as they
are not obviously assignable to one or the other category.229

224. See, e.g., Gamble, supra note 223, at 434–37; Petras, supra note 223; Romano, supra
note 215, at 1, 12; see also FRANK, supra note 218, at 89–97.
225. In response, see Tony Blair, Third Way, Again, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 11,
2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2016/03/11/132492
/third-way-again/(arguing that Third Way politics are “not about abandoning principle”
but rather about balancing growth with social protection); Giddens, The Third Way Revisited, supra note 223 (rejecting this characterization and arguing that social democracy had to
evolve to survive); Judis, supra note 223 (characterizing Third Way politics as “the only
politically viable alternative to laissez-faire conservatism and the populist right, as well as
to socialist or social-democratic politics of the old left”).
226. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 9.
227. Id.; FRANK, supra note 218, at 68.
228. FRANK, supra note 218, at 69 (emphasis removed).
229. See id. at 20–25, 68–73, 129–30; see also Romano, supra note 215, at 5–6.
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The New Democrats’ embrace of finance over recent decades
clearly paid dividends in the form of campaign funds.230 The very
close ties between Bill Clinton’s administration and Wall Street
leaders are well known. This period also saw substantial
deregulation of finance—with noteworthy examples including the
lifting of restrictions on interstate banking and the repeal of the
Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, which had previously separated investment banking from commercial banking.231 Over
recent years, Democratic presidential candidates have generally
done very well in raising campaign funds from financial donors.
In the 2008 election, Barack Obama raised more money than any
other candidate from commercial banks, hedge funds and private
equity donors, real estate donors, and the securities and investment industry, and came in a close second with insurance
donors.232 In the 2012 election, Mitt Romney outdid Obama in all
of these categories,233 perhaps reflecting distaste for Obama’s post230. Data on the sources of campaign funds are collected and made available by the
Center for Responsive Politics, a “[n]onpartisan, independent and nonprofit” organization
that “track[s] money in U.S. politics and its effect on elections and public policy.” Ctr. for
Responsive Politics, Our Vision and Mission: Inform, Empower & Advocate, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/about/ (last visited June 25, 2018). Its website, OpenSecrets.org,
“is the most comprehensive resource for federal campaign contributions, lobbying data and
analysis available.” Id.
231. See FRANK, supra note 218, at 97–105; Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose,
supra note 4, at 549–50.
232. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate Sector Totals to
Candidates, O PENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/sectors.php?sector=F
(last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive
Politics, Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Commercial Banks,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F03 (last visited
June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Hedge Funds & Private Equity,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F27 (last visited
June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Insurance, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://
www.opensecrets.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F09 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Presidential Candidates:
Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Real Estate, O PENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets
.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F10 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign
donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals,
2008 Cycle: Securities & Investment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08
/select.php?ind=F07 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data).
233. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate Sector Totals to
Candidates, O PENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/sectors.php?sector=F
(last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive
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crisis financial regulatory initiatives, as well as Mitt Romney’s
greater appeal among these donors as a former private equity
investor himself.234 In the 2016 election, however, Hillary Clinton
topped all other candidates in several of these categories, including commercial banks, hedge funds and private equity donors,
real estate donors, and the securities and investment industry.235
To be sure, there is ample evidence that, overall, financial
sector campaign contributions are bipartisan and typically follow

Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Commercial Banks, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.
opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F03 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential
campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Hedge Funds
& Private Equity, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind
=F27 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for
Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Insurance, O PENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.
opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F09 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential
campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Real Estate,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F10 (last visited
June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Selected Industry Totals: Securities & Investment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.open
secrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F07 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential campaign donations data).
234. See William D. Cohan, Why Wall Street Loves Hillary, POLITICO (Nov. 11, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/11/why-wall-street-loves-hillary-112782
(“During the 2012 presidential election, Wall Street felt burned by Obama’s rhetoric and
regulatory positions and overwhelmingly supported with their money Republican
candidate Mitt Romney, co-founder of private-equity firm Bain Capital.”).
235. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Sector Totals to Candidates: Finance/Insurance/
Real Estate, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-sectors?sector
=F (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for
Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Commercial Banks, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://
www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-industries?ind=F03 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016
presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals:
Hedge Funds & Private Equity, O PENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16
/select-industries?ind=F27 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign
donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Insurance,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-industries?ind=F09 (last
visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive
Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Real Estate, O PENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets
.org/pres16/select-industries?ind=F10 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Securities &
Investment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-industries? ind=
F07 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign donations data); see also Cohan,
supra note 234 (“The bottom line for Wall Street . . . is that Clinton understands that
America’s much-maligned financial industry wants to be part of the solution to the
country’s problems.”).
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the power,236 and much of Hillary Clinton’s support in the 2016
race came from a small number of ultra-rich donors.237 Nevertheless, it remained clear that she had “deep and lasting relationships with banking and investment titans” extending back to her
husband’s presidency, which were reinforced during her service as a
senator for New York, where Wall Street was a vital constituency.238
In discerning the relevance of the foregoing to the issues and
subject matter at the heart of this article—the politics of corporate
governance—it is critical to recognize that Democratic Party
operatives need not necessarily care about these issues in and of
themselves and, indeed, may know little about them. From a
narrow instrumental perspective, it is entirely plausible that their
goal is simply to assemble a stable coalition that can finance a
national electoral strategy—and if that coalition favors shareholders, then we should not expect these party officials to concern
themselves with ensuring the coherence of such policies with
state-level “progressive” preferences regarding substantive
corporate law.
An indirect indication that such dynamics may be operative
arises from intra-party tensions over the perception that the
“New” Democratic Party has excessively retreated from their
traditional strong-form commitment to the pursuit of equality and
improving the lot of working people.239 Over recent years, there
has been a growing impression, as Steven Hayward puts it, that
“the ‘malefactors of great wealth’ have become the benefactors of
today’s liberalism, and Democrats have become the party of the
236. See, e.g., Press Release, Wall Street Watch, $5 Billion in Political Contributions
Bought Wall Street Freedom from Regulation, Restraint, Report Finds (Mar. 4, 2009),
http://wallstreetwatch.org/soldoutreport.php (observing that from 1998 to 2008 “about 55
percent of [Wall Street] political donations went to Republicans and 45 percent to
Democrats, primarily reflecting the balance of power over the decade”); see also Ctr. for
Responsive Politics, Banking: Data Snapshot, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets
.org/news/issues/banking/data.php (last visited June 25, 2018) (2011–12 data on the banking, securities, and insurance industry’s campaign finance and lobbying activity).
237. See Matea Gold et al., Clinton Blasts Wall Street, but Still Draws Millions in
Contributions, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/clinton-blasts-wall-street-but-still-draws-millions-in-contributions/2016/02/04/05e1be00
-c9c2-11e5-ae11-57b6aeab993f_story.html (reporting that approximately half of Clinton’s
donations from the financial sector came from George Soros and S. Donald Sussman).
238. Id.
239. See generally FRANK, supra note 218.
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rich.”240 This perception reflects the fact that even though “labor
unions (along with trial lawyers) still provide the majority of the
Democratic Party’s campaign funds and organizational muscle on
election day,” the “super rich of Silicon Valley and Wall Street . . .
command the priority attention of Democratic Party leaders these
days.”241 A more direct indication that such dynamics may be
operative arises, then, from the fact that the inherent, substantive
implications of “New Democratic” or “Third Way” political principles for corporate governance remain far from clear. A brief
perusal of Democratic Party platforms since the early 1990s, for
example, reveals that corporate governance has received scant
attention, prompting at most an occasional, oblique reference with
no substantive discussion of any sort.242
Meanwhile, it is quite clear that Democrats have, over recent
decades, sought to forge a coalition of financial and labor
interests.243 “Third Way” parties of the center-left have broadly

240. Steven F. Hayward, How Did the Democrats Become the Party of the Rich?, FORBES
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenhayward/2014/01/08/how-did-the
-democrats-become-the-party-of-the-rich/print/.
241. Id.; see also CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 19 (observing that the United States now has
“two pro-business parties”).
242. For examples (in chronological order), see Democratic Party, A New Covenant
with the American People (July 13, 1992), supra note 222 (endorsing collective bargaining and
pay-for-performance among corporate executives, without substantial discussion);
Democratic Party, Today’s Democratic Party: Meeting America’s Challenges, Protecting
America’s Values (Aug. 26, 1996), supra note 222 (calling for “long-term” corporate
investment and “opportunities for greater involvement in company decision making and
ownership,” without substantial discussion); Democratic Party, 2000 Democratic Party
Platform (Aug. 14, 2000), supra note 222 (making no straightforward mention of topics
related to corporate governance); Democratic Party, 2004 Democratic Party Platform (July 27,
2004), supra note 222 (endorsing “requiring honesty in corporate accounting[,] effective
corporate governance, [and] a fair shake for small investors and worker pension funds,”
without substantial discussion); Democratic Party, Renewing America’s Promise (Aug. 25,
2008), supra note 222 (endorsing say-on-pay votes and “innovation in corporate responsibility,” without substantial discussion); Democratic Party, Moving America Forward
(Sept. 3, 2012), supra note 222 (associating shareholder wealth maximization and
recklessness on Wall Street with Republicans, without substantial discussion). For similarly
vague discussions of corporate governance in the context of “Third Way” political
discussions outside the United States see, for example, GIDDENS, CRITICS, supra note 223, at
118–19 (endorsing pay-for-performance and corporate social responsibility, without
substantial discussion) and at 149–52 (endorsing “employee share ownership schemes” and
rejecting both strong-form shareholder-centrism and stakeholder-centrism, without identifying a favored alternative).
243. See Hershey, supra note 215, at 266.
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been criticized for seeking “to construct a bogus coalition between
the haves and the have nots,”244 and whether or not this is a fair
characterization, it bore fruit as a matter of electoral politics245—at
least for a time. Regardless of the quite marginal nature of corporate governance in larger strategic thinking about electoral
coalitions and the overall party platform, it is equally undeniable
that this shift has had significant effects on how the left positions
itself on corporate governance issues as a matter of national party
politics. At its most elemental level, in corporate governance
terms, a coalition of financial and labor interests effectively allies
shareholders and employees against management—and the
potency of this coalition has been fully apparent in reform efforts
over recent years. Notably, the highly shareholder-centric reforms
adopted in the wake of the financial crisis (described above) have,
both rhetorically and substantively, focused intensely on the
interests and perceived vulnerabilities of the “middle class.” This
amorphous concept has “come generally to stand for the
investment-related and social welfare-related goals and concerns
of the average working family,” creating “a conceptual bridge
between the incentives and interests of ‘employees’ and
‘shareholders’” due to the market and legal dynamics described in
prior sections.246
The political power of this framing is rooted in such market
and legal dynamics.247 In understanding the political dynamics,
however, it remains critical to bear in mind that intellectual
coherence in the theory and practice of corporate governance need
not be (and likely is not) of central concern to any relevant actor at
the federal level. Simply put, electoral imperatives trump all, and
pursuit of these imperatives requires taking the foregoing market
trends, legal developments, and political realities as they are and
244. Dickson, supra note 223; see also FRANK, supra note 218, at 58; GIDDENS, CRITICS,
supra note 223, at 22–23; Romano, supra note 215, at 12–13; Wilson, supra note 214, at 203.
245. See, e.g., Judis, supra note 223 (observing that “Clinton was the first Democrat reelected since Roosevelt” and that “Blair was the first Labour prime minister ever to
succeed himself”).
246. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40,
at 278–86; see also Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose, supra note 4, at 553–55; Bruner,
Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, supra note 68, at 336–39.
247. See, e.g., CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 9–10, 26, 37, 113–14, 232, 240–41; Gelter, The
Pension System, supra note 75, at 912–15.
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endeavoring to forge an effective coalition using the tools and
opportunities at hand.
To be sure, while these dynamics have remained important to
the Democratic Party’s electoral strategy since the 1990s, the
finance-driven coalition described above remains highly controversial and unstable, reflecting the fact that core intellectual and
ideological tensions in the platform of the U.S. center-left persist.248 In the 2016 primary, for example, Hillary Clinton’s “deep
ties to the financial sector . . . emerged as one of her biggest
obstacles,” and as of February 2016 she had already “earned more
than $3.7 million for delivering paid speeches to banks and other
financial services firms since leaving the State Department in
2013.”249 Her strained efforts to reintroduce more traditional leftwing themes, while at the same time maintaining a bridge to
finance, led some to criticize such toggling between the “reform
wing” and the “Wall Street wing” of the Democratic Party.250
Perhaps tellingly, even when she made “forays into fiery rhetoric”
to match Sanders, Wall Street bankers by and large “dismiss[ed] it
quickly as political maneuvers. None of them [thought] she really
mean[t] her populism.”251 As of this writing, it remains unclear
whether the New Democratic coalition and associated electoral
strategy can survive Clinton’s loss to her fundamentally populist
Republican opponent, Donald Trump252—an unexpected defeat

248. Cf. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 32, 250 (observing that the shareholder-employee
coalition “is founded on the narrowest of grounds and should prove the most unstable”
due to the numerous “areas of conflict” between them, including “takeover law, norms of
shareholder primacy, stakeholder rights and employee representation, and distributional issues”).
249. Gold et al., supra note 237; see also Cohan, supra note 234.
250. See Gold et al., supra note 237; see also Thomas Frank, The Issue Is Not Hillary
Clinton’s Wall St Links but Democrats’ Core Dogmas, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2016), http://
www.theguardian.com/global/2016/feb/16/the-issue-is-not-hillary-clintons-wall-st-links
-but-her-partys-core-dogmas (observing that Sanders’s surge in the primary was not due to
voters rejecting “Hillary the Capable,” but rather “the party whose leadership faction she
represents as well as the direction in which our modern Democrats have been travelling
for decades”).
251. Cohan, supra note 234.
252. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The Top 15 Democratic Presidential Candidates for 2020,
Ranked, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp
/2017/12/22/the-top-15-democratic-presidential-candidates-for-2020-ranked/?utm_term=
.bae7685a4a40 (observing that, as of December 2017, the “field appears certain to be
extremely big and wide open”); see also Chris Cillizza, The Next Generation of Democratic
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attributed in part to Clinton’s inability “to make a persuasive case
for herself as a champion of the economically downtrodden.”253
Her loss was widely interpreted as “a historic rebuke of the
Democratic Party from the white blue-collar voters who had
formed the party base from the presidency of Franklin D.
Roosevelt,” costing the party the support of Midwest “industrial
towns once full of union voters.”254
Undoubtedly, post-crisis reform efforts favoring shareholders—even though short-term risk-seeking is thought to have
driven the crisis—reflect just how thoroughly bound up the
Democratic Party became with the financial sector and their
interests. The fact that corporate governance reforms suddenly
received such emphasis, rather than meaningful financial sector
reform, illustrated the power of “[i]nterest group alignments and
coalitional dynamics.”255 Financial institutions “fiercely resisted
broader financial system reforms,” and their “[m]uted opposition
to the progress of corporate governance reforms . . . may have
reflected a political and legal bet by financial sector managers that
enhanced shareholder powers within corporate governance
would likely prove less constraining and threatening than other
items on the postcrisis reform agenda.”256 In this light, it was
hardly surprising that Hillary Clinton’s financial policy ideas in
the 2016 election were thought to have come straight from Wall

Leaders Is, Um, Nonexistent, WASH. P OST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/the-next-generation-of-democratic-leaders-is-um-nonex
istent/?utm_term=.956ae499736b; Sam Frizell, Democrats Elevate Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth
Warren as Party Plots Comeback, TIME (Nov. 16, 2016), http://time.com/4573592/bernie
-sanders-elizabeth-warren-democrats/; Ed Kilgore, The End of the Clinton Era of Democratic
Politics, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 10, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/the
-end-of-the-clinton-era-of-democratic-politics.html; Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns,
Democrats at Crossroads: Win Back Working-Class Whites, or Let Them Go?, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/us/politics/democrats-joe-biden
-hillary-clinton.html?ref=politics&_r=0.
253. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Is Elected President in Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html?action=click&pgtype
=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=span-abc-region&region=span-abc-region
&WT.nav=span-abc-region.
254. Id.
255. See CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 214.
256. See id. at 209–17; see also Robert B. Reich, Wall Street’s Democrats, R OBERT REICH
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://robertreich.org/post/104684097130.
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Street. These included resistance against reinstating the GlassSteagall Act, endorsement of initiatives to promote long-term
investment, and “clos[ure of] the carried-interest tax loophole
through which private equity, venture capital, real estate and
hedge fund investors are able to pay lower taxes on certain
investment profits” (a proposal opposed by private equity
investors but endorsed by many other Clinton supporters).257 Such
ideas reflected “a likely osmosis of ideas from years of interaction
with people interested in finance,”258 aptly summarizing the
manner in which the Democratic Party has absorbed ideas and
campaign contributions from financial sector donors. These dynamics, in turn, have amplified the political rationale driving the
Democrats toward the political center and dovetailing with the
market and legal dynamics described above. These are powerful
economic, legal, and political forces indeed—and the compatibility of their impacts with theoretical approaches and policies
favored by “progressive” commentators on state-level corporate
law simply is not part of the equation.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR STATE/FEDERAL CONVERGENCE
In light of the complex and surprising manner in which the
disjuncture between the corporate governance policy preferences
of the political left at the state and federal levels has arisen, it
remains to consider what the prospects for convergence might be.
While a possibility for convergence exists, it is difficult to imagine
the gap closing entirely, and the principal modes of potential
convergence are not necessarily to be found where many might
have expected them to arise.
In theory, direct linkages between federal and state law
affecting corporate governance might develop. At the extreme,
Congress retains authority under the Commerce Clause to take
over the field of corporate law as and when it likes.259 Federalizing corporate law was proposed at various points in the
257. See Anupreeta Das, Hillary Clinton No Stranger to Wall Street’s Thinkers, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 8, 2016, 4:59 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/02/08/hillary
-clinton-no-stranger-to-wall-streets-thinkers/.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 66.
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twentieth century, though such efforts went nowhere,260 and
nothing in the way of recent developments would tend to suggest
that such a possibility has become any more likely. More
modestly, linkages might be forged directly between relevant
federal and state actors—one noteworthy example being the
process by which the SEC can submit questions of corporate law
directly to the Delaware Supreme Court.261 This mechanism has
remained little used, however, and as a general matter, federal
lawmakers and regulators obviously need not consult Delaware if
they do not care (or do not think they will like) what Delaware has
to say262—a distinct possibility that follows directly from the sorts
of distinctions drawn throughout this article.
Another potential mode of federal and state coordination in
this area, which has arisen in unexpected ways over recent years,
involves pronouncements on the nature and purposes of corporations from none other than the U.S. Supreme Court itself. Just as
Congress can legislatively impact corporate governance, the U.S.
Supreme Court can judicially impact it, and this has been vividly
illustrated in recent years by two decisions with substantial
implications for the sorts of dynamics discussed here—the 2010
Citizens United decision263 and the 2014 Hobby Lobby decision.264
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down a provision
of the McCain-Feingold Act that had prevented corporations from
making independent political campaign expenditures from the
corporate treasury, concluding that “the Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”265 Even
though the opinion was “the product of the five more conservative judges on the Court,” its reasoning is, as Leo Strine and
260. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
261. See Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism, supra note 68, at 16–20, 36–38, 42–51

(providing background on this process).
262. Cf. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 67, at 600–06 (arguing that, if anything,
due to the omnipresent threat of federal intervention, Delaware corporate law consists of
“only what the federal authorities like or tolerate”).
263. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
264. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
265. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66 (striking down § 203 of the McCain-Feingold
Act); see also Kesten, supra note 137, at 163–75; Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 359–62.
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Nicholas Walter emphasize, clearly “inconsistent with conservative corporate theory,” in that the Court legitimated unlimited
expenditures by reference to shareholder-imposed constraints,
notwithstanding the widespread conservative view that shareholders are poorly positioned to monitor management.266 Furthermore, they observe, the conceptual and moral argument in favor
of shareholder wealth maximization is effectively undermined by
corporations’ newfound ability to engage in unlimited political
spending. 267 The expectation that corporations will spend corporate resources to preclude or eliminate costly regulation undermines reliance upon extra-corporate regulation as a means of
forcing corporations to absorb the costs of externalities that flow
directly from the single-minded pursuit of shareholder wealth.268
Strine self-identifies as “an unabashed New Deal Democrat,”269
who apparently favors shareholder wealth maximization as a
corporate law rule, combined with robust external regulation to
contain its excesses.270 He acknowledges (in his work with
Walter), however, that shareholder wealth maximization looks
quite unappealing when corporations have such extraordinary
latitude to interfere directly in the processes that generate the
rules purportedly constraining them—and that stakeholderoriented theories of the corporation and corporate law correlatively look more appealing.271

266.
267.
268.
269.

See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 337–40, 363–65.
See id. at 363–65.
See id. at 342–46, 350–59, 381–89; see also Kesten, supra note 137, at 182, 221.
David Marcus, Leo Strine’s Marvelous Adventures, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 2, 2008), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2008/10/02
/leo-strines-marvelous-adventures/; see also Strine, Toward Common Sense, supra note 43, at
2 (describing his work as “counsel and policy director” to Governor Thomas Carper, a
“New Democrat”); Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 761 (implicitly identifying
with “the center-left of American politics”).
270. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 768, 786–93.
271. See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 389–90. I have argued elsewhere that the
weakness of extra-corporate protections for non-shareholders (particularly employees) in
the United States has effectively inhibited U.S. corporate law from adopting the more
shareholder-centric governance structures that one finds in jurisdictions offering more
robust social welfare protections, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.
See generally BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra
note 40.
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It is interesting, and perhaps ironic, that progressive corporate
law theory would be bolstered in this oddly indirect manner by
the conservative justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, but this is not
the only instance in which this has occurred. Corporate law
theorists of a progressive bent can similarly find Supreme Court
authority to bolster their views in the Hobby Lobby decision, where
the Court held that closely held for-profit corporations with religious owners can invoke free exercise protections under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), that the contraceptive
mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially burdened the free exercise rights of such corporations, and that the
mandate could not be justified as “the least restrictive means of
serving a compelling government interest.”272 In so doing, the Supreme Court—again, through its conservative justices273—
articulated a “vision of corporations [that] is highly consistent
with liberal visions of the corporation,” notably in rejecting the
notion that shareholder wealth maximization represents the sole
legitimate aim of corporation decision-making.274 Strict commitment to shareholder wealth maximization, to the exclusion of all
other goals, might tend to imply that for-profit corporations
should not have standing to pursue free exercise complaints
under the RFRA,275 yet the Court outright rejected such a narrow
conception of the for-profit corporation’s legitimate aims:
Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not
protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such
corporations is simply to make money. This argument flies in the
face of modern corporate law. . . . While it is certainly true that a
central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money,
modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to

272. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014); see also
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 1–2
(2014). While the opinion expressly did not address public companies, “the majority’s
reasoning” might well apply beyond the context of closely held companies. See Johnson &
Millon, supra, at 25–26.
273. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas (with Kennedy filing a concurring opinion). Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. at 2759; see also McDonnell, supra note 4, at 778 (“Conservatives celebrated, while
liberals expressed outrage.”).
274. See McDonnell, supra note 4, at 778–83.
275. See id. at 789–91.
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pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not
do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all
uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and
other altruistic objectives. . . . If for-profit corporations may
pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why
they may not further religious objectives as well.276

As Brett McDonnell observes, this conception of the corporation’s
legitimate purposes “works as a ringing endorsement of the stakeholder conception of the corporation that many liberals and progressives prefer” and “certainly denies the existence of an immutable duty to only consider the financial interests of shareholders.”277
To be sure, the political left has hardly celebrated the opinion.
While Democrats supported enactment of the RFRA (during the
Clinton administration, at a time when Democrats controlled both
houses of Congress), the ACA is by and large quite important to
many on the left, who “may not identify with the sorts of religious
commitments one finds in this case.”278 It is indeed striking that
state corporate law progressives not only would encounter
hostility toward their views on corporate law among the
Democratic Party establishment and central components of the
modern Democratic electoral coalition, but that they would find
their most powerful federal allies (at least in corporate governance
terms) among the conservative justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court.279 As Lyman Johnson, a conservative communitarian
scholar, and David Millon, a left-leaning scholar, observe together
in their analysis of the Hobby Lobby decision, however, the
majority’s “decidedly pluralistic view of corporate purpose”
naturally—and perhaps necessarily—facilitates pursuit of both
276. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71.
277. McDonnell, supra note 4, at 804; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 272, at 10

(characterizing the government’s argument “that business corporations lack the lawful
authority to do anything other than pursue financial gain” as a view that “resonates with
the claims of conservative corporate law academics who assert that corporate law
mandates profit maximization”).
278. McDonnell, supra note 4, at 808; see also id. at 784–85, 808–11, 820.
279. It should be noted that this disjuncture reflects an inconsistency among political
conservatives as well, in terms of overall normative preferences in corporate governance—
notably between libertarian and communitarian brands of conservatism. See supra notes 18–
21 and accompanying text.
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religiously motivated corporate goals, predominantly (though not
exclusively) resonating with those on the right, and “such avowed
goals as social justice, environmental concerns, and employee
welfare,” predominantly (though not exclusively) resonating with
those on the left.280 This is an important dimension of the opinion
“that critics have overlooked.”281
The Supreme Court’s Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions illustrate that, as among the political left, views regarding
the desirability or inevitability of strict shareholder-centrism vary
considerably among the political right—and that conservative
communitarianism and social liberalism can more easily find
common cause in debates regarding corporate purpose than is
typically acknowledged. Ultimately, however, it is unlikely that
such developments will go very far in rendering the overall U.S.
corporate governance system any more conceptually coherent
than it is today. Generally speaking, it has to be conceded that the
U.S. Supreme Court is hardly the forum to which one looks for
top-shelf corporate legal theory.282 (The same, of course, could be
said of Congress.283) And when it comes to corporate purpose–
related issues not involving a federal constitutional dimension,
state courts and legislatures—who remain the authors of
corporate law—will not be bound by U.S. Supreme Court analyses
in any event.284 Netting all of this out, and given the extraordinary
range of political views and commitments driving these divergent
federal trends—as well as the fact that the substantive integrity
and overall coherence of U.S. corporate governance hardly looms
large for any relevant federal actor—there is little reason to
believe that the state/federal divide described in this article will
substantially close in the foreseeable future.
280. Johnson & Millon, supra note 272, at 22.
281. Id. at 31.
282. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 4, at 802–03, 806 (“Supreme Court justices are not

chosen for their expertise in corporate law, and it shows.”).
283. See generally Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90 (critiquing the Dodd-Frank
Act as “quack” corporate governance legislation); Romano, supra note 75 (similarly
critiquing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as “quack” corporate governance legislation).
284. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 272, at 24 (observing that in such a case “the
Delaware Court of Chancery would presumably treat the Hobby Lobby opinion as highly
persuasive, but the Delaware Supreme Court would not be bound to follow Hobby Lobby’s
reading of the breadth of corporate purpose”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The fact that left-leaning actors, whom one might reasonably
have expected to arrive at similar views on the desirability of
shareholder-centric policies, have pursued diametrically opposed
normative agendas at the state and federal levels, reflects the
extraordinary legal, institutional, and political complexities of
corporate governance in the United States. This article has argued
that a widespread and fundamental reorientation of the Democratic Party toward decidedly centrist national politics over recent
decades fundamentally altered the role of corporate governance,
and related issues, in the project of assembling a competitive
electoral coalition. It has argued further that the legal, economic,
and cultural trends that conditioned and incentivized this shift are
critical to understanding the state/federal divide regarding what
the “progressive” corporate governance agenda ought to be. As
we have seen, several trends have prompted a center-left politics
of corporate governance at the federal level bearing no relation
whatsoever to the progressive agenda for corporate law at the
state level. Such trends include the reorientation of labor unions
away from traditional organizing activities and toward pension
management; the intense (and ironic) focus of applicable labor
regulation on generating returns for pensioners, including
fiduciary obligations interpreted to require pensions to engage in
activism aimed at forcing corporate managers to focus intently on
maximizing returns to shareholders; and the increasingly centrist
Democratic Party’s efforts to capitalize on these pro-shareholder
trends by assembling an anti-manager “middle class” coalition of
workers and financial institutions.
I have suggested that this state/federal divide is unlikely to
close in the foreseeable future, but that certainly does not mean
the landscape will remain static. To the contrary, many of the
legal, economic, and cultural trends described above continue to
evolve. Ongoing developments affecting the power base, the
interests, and the identity of organized labor—as well as the
electoral strategy of the Democratic Party—will have a major
impact on how U.S. corporate governance develops over years to
come. It bears emphasizing that, just as flagging membership has
prompted a shift from traditional organizing activities toward
pension management as private-sector unions’ constituencies age,
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so we can expect that the political and market salience of these
institutions will wane as today’s smaller active membership
becomes tomorrow’s smaller base of pension beneficiaries.285 As
such developments unfold (potentially over the course of decades), other forms of institutional investors may enjoy proportionately greater salience in electoral politics.286 It remains entirely
conceivable, however, that labor might politically reassert itself in
some new institutional configuration—or return to a more central
position in the Democratic coalition and electoral strategy
following Hillary Clinton’s unexpected 2016 loss287—with consequences that are difficult to foresee. All that can be predicted with
any certainty is that electoral imperatives will remain paramount
in the formulation of federal corporate governance policy, and
that the center-left’s federal corporate governance politics will accordingly move in whatever direction the prevailing wind blows.

285. Cf. Dunn & Walker, supra note 128, at 8 (“In 2015, union membership rates were
highest among workers ages 45 to 64—13.6 percent for those ages 45 to 54 and 14.3 percent
for those ages 55 to 64. Nearly half of all union members were between 45 and 64 years old
in 2015. . . . The lowest union membership rate was among workers ages 16 to 24 (4.4
percent).”) Meanwhile, a 2013 survey of “leaders from 102 of the largest US Taft-Hartley
pension funds, representing $150 billion in assets under management,” found “a stirring
level of doubt among plan leaders that the existing multiemployer system is sustainable”
due in part to “a pronounced demographic shift.” See PYRAMIS GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra
note 133, at 1. Pyramis explains that “[a]n increasing number of retirees are now drawing
their retirement and fewer active members are factored in to the contribution math,
creating an unbalanced formula.” Id. Accordingly, “[n]early 40% do not believe the current
multiemployer system is sustainable,” and “[n]early four out of every five (79%) indicated
that a new system would likely be in place” ten years out. Id. at 1, 6.
286. Cf. Dunn & Walker, supra note 128, at 1, 3–4 (reporting that, in contrast with
private-sector pensions, “union membership rates in the public sector . . . have held fairly
steady since the early 1980s” and that as of 2015 “public-sector workers had a union
membership rate of 35.2 percent, more than five times higher than that of private-sector
workers (6.7 percent)”); Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 930–34
(discussing “various institutional investors fac[ing] differing pressures to pursue shortterm investment strategies”).
287. See, e.g., Ian McKendry, Trump’s Surprise Victory Changes the Game for Financial
Services, AM. BANKER (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regu
lation/trumps-surprise-victory-changes-the-game-for-financial-services-10923351.html?zk
Printable=true (speculating that “Hillary Clinton’s losses in traditionally Democratic states
like Wisconsin will likely embolden the progressive wing of the party” and observing in
the immediate aftermath that “Democrats anxious about a Trump victory were calling on
[Elizabeth] Warren to run for president in 2020”); see also supra note 252.
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